Showing posts with label Hoboken. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hoboken. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 14, 2017

Estimating Local Fair Share for 2017-18


Update: Local Fair Share, Capped Aid, and Uncapped Aid are now available

The following is moot.



After the Department of Education came out with 2017-18 state aid proposals I made an OPRA request of the Department of Education for 2017-18 Uncapped Aid and Local Fair Share.

I wanted Uncapped Aid so I could see what the total deficit is for the underaided districts, see what districts are the most underaided, see the total surplus for the overaided districts, and see what districts are the most overaided.

I wanted Local Fair Share so I could see whose taxes are the heaviest, whose taxes are the lightest, and what the median district in New Jersey pays.

I did not request Adequacy Budgets because spending relative to Adequacy is also determined by local tax effort and a focus on whose spending is above and below Adequacy can distract from state aid fairness.  Also, Adequacy Budgets are embedded into the calculation of Uncapped Aid anyway.

To my disappointment, the Department of Education said it did not calculate Local Fair Share and Uncapped Aid for 2017-18.  They did not give a reason, but my conjecture is that it was Christie who made the final decision not to bother with even the hypothetical operation of SFRA.

Nevertheless, the Department of Education did send me the components of Local Fair Share, which are Equalized Valuation (from the previous fiscal year, so 2016) and Aggregate Income (from three  years previous, so 2014).

The formula for Local Fair Share changes year to year, but by plugging in Equalized Valuation and Aggregate Income figures into the 2016-17 formula, I can ESTIMATE 2017-18 Local Fair Share and compare district tax bases.

This is the (first) formula for Local Fair Share used in 2016-17:

(Equalized Valuation x 0.013156218 + Aggregate Income x 0.046185507)/2

To see more about changes in Equalized Valuation between FY2016 and FY2017, please see this post of mine.

As usual, I've put the data online here.  2016-17 data, to which I make comparisons, is available here.

Yet again, these amounts are ESTIMATES - especially the year to year comparisons - since I have no idea what the multipliers should be in the 2017-18.



On the other hand, the relational comparisons between different towns should be very solid, since I am applying the same multipliers to every district for 2017-18.  If these calculations show that Hoboken's Local Fair Share is New Jersey's third highest at $195 million, I'd be surprised if the DOE's calculations give any different ranking, even if the exact Local Fair Share turns out to be something other than $195 million.

Hopefully the legislature will pressure Department of Education to simply run the formula so that the public may have a more informed conversation about state aid.

Anyway here goes:

  • Jersey City's Local Fair Share would increase by another $20 million to $353 million.  This is powered by a $4 billion increase in the Equalized Valuation  (to $25.7 bil) and a $502 million increase in the Aggregate Income (to $8 bil).

    Jersey City's Local Fair Share appears to be now 76% larger than the next largest district's, which is Edison at $200 million.  For 2016-17 Jersey City's Local Fair Share was "only" 60% larger than Edison's.
  • Hoboken's gained $1.8 billion in Equalized Valuation and $357 million in Aggregate Income.  Whatever the exact  Local Fair Share formula ends up being, Hoboken's Local Fair Share would likely be around  $195 million and be the third largest in New Jersey, after Jersey City and slightly behind Edison.  This year Hoboken's Local Fair Share surpasses Toms River's.

    Hoboken's 2016-17 tax levy was only $42 million, so for 2017-18 Hoboken's taxes will be barely a fifth of Local Fair Share

    For the last year pro-reformers in the legislature have pushed to eliminate Adjustment Aid, but there are certain low-student population districts such as Hoboken, some wealthy enclaves like Alpine and Harding, and many Jersey Shore resort towns who have no need for any state aid whatsoever.  
  • There is also increases in other Hudson County towns, powered by non-Hoboken/non-Jersey City Hudson County's $5 billion increase in Equalized Valuation.  West New York's would be $4 million larger, driven by 10% increases in Equalized Valuation and Aggregate Income.

    Union City, Bayonne, North Bergen, Harrison, Kearny, and others would have small increases (the small increases might be smoothed away if the DOE actually ran the formula)
  • Asbury Park's Local Fair Share would actually shrank (by a tiny amount). That's outrageous, since Asbury Park is undergoing a building boom. Asbury Park is just as much an example of the exploitation of the PILOT law as Jersey City is.  
  • Atlantic City's Local Fair Share fell by another $13 million, from $65 million to $52 million.  This is due to the loss of another $2 billion in Equalized Valuation and $8 million in Aggregate Income.

    Atlantic City's school tax levy for 2016-17 was $82 million, so Atlatic City's taxes may be 157% of Local Fair Share.

  • Manchester Regional's taxes are likely the state's highest again.  My estimate is that Manchester Regional's Local Fair Share is only $4.9 million, so the $10.9 million (which falls disproportionately on Prospect Park and Haledon due to Manchester Regional's unique tax-apportionment scheme) is absolutely brutal.
  •  
  • Newark's Local Fair Share may have grown slightly, by $6 million, from $161 million to $167 million. (Newark's actual tax levy is $123 million)
  • Paterson's Local Fair Share may have grown slightly too, by $3 million, from $85 million to $88 million (Paterson's actual tax levy is only $41.5 million)

Again, the above figures are only ESTIMATES, but I hope this post generates discussion, particularly regarding Hoboken and Jersey City's state aid and the acute tax crisis in Atlantic City.

Please ask your legislators to demand that the Department of Education do these calculations for real.

At the very least, we have to know  what the total deficit is for the underaided districts.  For 2016-17 it was $1.93 billion, which is far beyond any realistic tax increase.  This deficit number is a critical point in the argument for why redistribution is necessary.

----

See Also:

Thursday, June 9, 2016

Two Cheers For County Taxes!


No one loves their county government in New Jersey, but something that's almost never pointed out about county government is that county taxes are by far the fairest of the three major property taxes in New Jersey.

My point about county taxes being the fairest is intuitive, although seldom made and rarely quantified.  This post will hopefully demonstrate the superior fairness of county taxes and suggest that school taxes and aid can be made fairer by copying two features of county taxes, their broad base and the fact that they are reapportioned annually.

Yes, I know some readers are incredulous about any defense of county government in New Jersey.  I agree that county government has a lot of corruption, bossism, and nepotism.  County government is more distant from constituents than school boards and municipalities and few of us feel we get much direct benefit from it.  And yet, the concept of countywide services and countywide tax base has many attractive features.  This post will demonstrate two of those features, with a focus on the benefits of annual reapportionment.

The greater fairness of county taxes come from two factors:

1.  Counties vary in wealth, but since counties are larger and more diverse than municipalities, the variation between county wealth is much narrower than the variation between towns and school districts and therefore tax rates are more similar.

2.  County taxes are reapportioned every year based on changes in Equalized Valuation and therefore are by far the most flexible of the three property tax types.

The apportionment method for county taxes is equivalent to a town doing a reval annually, but for towns themselves instead of individual property holdings.

County tax apportionment is determined by the percentage of a county's total Equalized Valuation that a town has.  So, if a town has 16% of a county's total Equalized Valuation one year, it pays 16% of the taxes and if the next year its percentage falls to 15%, it then pays 15% of that year's county taxes.

Equalized Valuation is computed by the ratio of sale prices in the previous year to the official assessments on those properties.  If average sale prices are 120% of official assessment, then the town's Equalized Valuation equals 120% of its official aggregate assessment.  If sales are on average for 95% of official assessment, then Equalized Valuation equals 95% of official aggregate assessment.

Equalized Valuation cannot be distorted by a lack of a reval, although it can be distorted by PILOTing.

The reduction in county taxes means that a town that is in economic decline gets some fiscal breathing room from the county that it would not in practice get on its school and municipal taxes, since the school district and municipality are stand-alone entities and state education aid and municipal aid are frozen.

(The source of this data is the "Abstract of Ratables" contained in the Department of Community Affairs' Property Tax Information Tables.)

Context Facts:



FYI: Counties and their Equalized County Tax Rates.

Note, this is not an apples to apples comparison since some counties provide more services than others, however, even comparing school taxes and municipal taxes isn't apples to apples either since taxpayers get different spending levels for their money.

Cumberland County1.06Union County0.528Burlington County0.398
Salem County1.042Sussex County0.515Middlesex County0.38
Camden County0.845Essex County0.512Somerset County0.37
Warren County0.75Hudson County0.511Hunterdon County0.364
Passaic County0.735Atlantic County0.456Monmouth County0.296
Gloucester County0.67STATE AVG0.604Morris County0.249
Mercer County0.632Ocean County0.405Cape May County0.241
Bergen County0.234




Theoretically school aid and municipal aid should increase for a declining town and offset tax increases, but our school and municipal aid formulas have never or rarely been fully funded, rationally distributed, and for the past few years they have been stuck at 2013 levels.  For many school districts, aid has effectively been frozen since 2002.

The Effects of Annual Reapportionment

There are several different ways to demonstrate changes in tax apportionment over time.

1.  A chronological comparison of a town's school district, municipal, and county taxes.
2.  A chronological comparison of the amount of money the towns of a county pay in county taxes.
3.  A chronological comparison of the percentage of county taxes coming from different towns.

The biggest swing in county taxation in NJ over the last few years has been in Atlantic County, where Atlantic City's county tax levy has fallen from $45 million to $28 million, or, from 32% of the total county tax levy down to 16%.   Yet, because Atlantic City is a special example where its major industry is collapsing, I will focus on more typical jurisdictions.

We'll use Newark as an example of a town with a declining tax base whose county taxes are stable as we compare the trajectories of Newark's school, municipal, and county taxes over the past seven years:



As you can see, Newark has almost doubled its municipal tax levy and increased its school levy by 25%, but its county tax levy has increased by only 13%, a figure that barely exceeds inflation.

Newark and its nearly satellite cities, Belleville, East Orange, Orange, Irvington, and even Bloomfield and Nutley continue to erode in tax base. Nutley, in fact, has done worse than Newark in the past few years, presumably because the closing of the Hoffman-LaRoche megaplant.

 The rest of Essex County holds its own, and then mostly Millburn assuming a higher share of the burden. Millburn's county tax levy has increased by 52% since 2007, from $31.8 million to $48.5 million.

Newark was called "America's Renaissance City" during the 1990s, but that's only true in relation to how awful Newark had it in the 1970s and 1980s. In tax base at least, Newark is still in relative and even absolute decline. Since 2013, Newark has lost over $2 billion in Equalized Valuation (from $15.5 billion to $13.3 billion in 2016).

The new townhouses that have popped up in Newark presumably add little to the tax base and Newark's new downtown buildings are almost all PILOTed.




Although there is nothing voluntary about Millburn assuming this burden, it is impressive.  In ten years, Millburn may actually surpass Newark to become Essex County's biggest taxpayer in absolute terms.

Trenton has had a similar phenomenon as Newark, but Trenton's tax base is even weaker than Newark's and it has not increased its municipal levy by as much and its school levy at all.


I hesitate to speculate on why Trenton's tax increase lags Newark's, but Trenton's all-in tax rate is 5.733, the fifth highest in New Jersey.  Newark's all-in tax rate is 3.308 and is nowhere near the worst in New Jersey.

Were I to graph all of Mercer County Trenton's portion of county taxes would shrink while towns growing in tax base or real estate prices would grow.   For Mercer County, Princeton and West Windsor have both assumed another $12 million each.

Paterson appears to be even weaker still than Newark and Trenton, as its county levy has actually FALLEN in the last six years from $45 million to $41.8 million.



Although I'm using NJ's largest cities like Trenton, Newark, and Paterson to illustrate changes in county taxes, there are many small towns who are declining even more.  Prospect Park for instance has struggled more than Newark has, so have Belleville and Nutley in Essex and presumably many satellite urban-suburbs.

Jersey City Mischief (As Usual)


The simple method of apportioning county taxes can be distorted by a town giving tax abatements.
The state's PILOT law is terribly designed and gives towns incentives to take advantage of their neighbors in regional school districts, counties, and the state as a whole.

The abuse is enabled by the fact that taxes in regional school districts, counties, and state aid are apportioned by Equalized Valuation, but a property with a tax abatement does not appear as part of a city's official assessment and is therefore "invisible" to the calculation of Equalized Valuation.  Since PILOTed properties aren't part of Equalized Valuation, they are "invisible" to the apportionment of taxes for regional school districts, counties, and state aid.

What makes the incentives even stronger is that PILOT payments can be structured so that the municipality gets more money from a property with a PILOT than it would from one under normal taxation.  This is because PILOT fees are paid 95% to the municipality and only 5% to the county, with the school system totally cut off.

Montclair has been completely open about how it uses PILOTs as a way of shielding its wealth from Essex County (ie, Newark).

As Montclair's Mayor Robert Jackson explained in 2013, "In a PILOT agreement, 95 percent of the tax revenue comes to the town, not 83 percent. We get more money from that PILOT than we would if they paid taxes." 

Montclair's deputy mayor, Robert Russo, chimed in, "That's what I really like about the [PILOT] program. I am not a fan of the county taking money from us. What we're doing is enhancing the township's revenue. No one [in Montclair] is getting hurt."

PILOTing directly benefits a municipality by diverting additional revenue to it (coming at the expense of the county and schools), but it also indirectly benefits a municipality by hiding the ratables from the county. This allows a municipality to hoard its tax base without sharing with the rest of the county.

As annoying as Montclair's PILOTing is and the mayoral bragging about it, Montclair doesn't allow very much new development period, so the overall percentage of Montclair's tax base that is hidden behind PILOTs is small. Even if most of Montclair weren't off-limits to new development, Montclair pays for its school school system with local taxes and if it PILOTed excessively it would be cannibalizing its own school tax base and have a voter rebellion.

Not so for Jersey City. Jersey City should be commended for how accepting it is of new housing, but its schools are paid for by the state and there is no incentive for it not to PILOT virtually everything.  Jersey City has thus exploited the PILOT law like no other town in New Jersey to the point where 30% of its valuation is PILOTed.   Jersey City's abuse of the PILOT law is so substantial that it was in fact sued by Secaucus, North Bergen, and Bayonne in the late 1990s/early 2000s over not paying for its fair share of county taxes.

Calculating backwards from some data the Jersey City municipality released in 2015, the valuation of Jersey City's PILOTed properties is about $8.6 billion.   Were those properties taxable and paying taxes at the .511 Hudson County tax rate, they would be paying about $43 million in county taxes.  

Jersey City's leadership is aware of how PILOTs distort county taxes (and state aid).  As former Jersey City Mayor (and convicted felon) Jerry McCann explained in April 2016 in a letter about Jersey City's tax history:
All tax abatement revenues are used to offset the amount needed to be raised through taxation. Tax abatements do reduce our share of the county taxes since [abated properties] are not part of that ratio [used to calculate Equalized Valuation]. If the abatements are removed, we will have to pay more in county taxes as well as [get] less in state aid for our schools.
(McCann's actual text is in the photo caption, I've interpolated some clarifying clauses)

Jersey City is New Jersey's economic boomtown, but if you look at just the last nine years, the percentage of Hudson County taxes paid by Jersey City has actually decreased.



Since Jersey City, by its own boasting, has been a boomtown, its portion of county taxes should have increased; it's possible that the decline is partly due to declining real estate values in outlying parts of the city, but it must also be partly attributable to the fact that a large portion of new development has been PILOTed.

The story of Hudson County for the last nine years as been Hoboken's explosive growth and assumption of county tax burden (with a slight assist from Weehawken).  Since 2005, Hoboken's county taxes have MORE THAN DOUBLED, from $32 million to $67 million, and Hoboken's county taxes exceed its municipal and school taxes.

It should be noted unlike for Newark, Trenton, and Paterson, Jersey City's county tax levy has increased substantially, from $75 million to $105 million, but has been proportional to the overall increase of Hudson County.

Also, if I were to begin this chart a few years earlier around the year 2000, Jersey City's portion of the Hudson County tax levy would increase, although suspiciously not in proportion to the perceived increase in Jersey City's wealth.

Finally, it should be noted that for FY2017, Jersey City is taking up another $10 million in county taxes and relieving almost every other town's burden, although Jersey City will still pay only 32.2% of Hudson County taxes, a percentage that is below where it was in just 2008.

Since Jersey City hides so much of its wealth from Equalized Valuation, Jersey City's freeholder Bill O'Dea should get a chutzpah award for voting against the last Hudson County budget because he thought the computation of Equalized Valuation was unfair to Jersey City.

“Our votes against it were more about some of the problems with the first Equalized Evaluations that’s required by state law, which shifts the burden of increases and spending to those cities, based on how much their property values go up year-to-year and we find that to be unfair,”

I can't get into the unfairness of Jersey City's own tax apportionment here, but Jersey City's surge in Equalized Valuation is due to gentrification along the waterfront while other neighborhoods see much less growth. Since Jersey City is a single-entity in the eyes of the formula for Equalized Valuation, and not a collection of distinct neighborhoods on their own trajectories, the increase in Equalized Valuation catches Greenville and other poorer areas up in it and Greenville residents have to pay for an increase in county taxes that isn't justified for them based on where their market values are.

Normally a town would reval and treat its own taxpayers fairly, but Jersey City hasn't done a reval since 1988.

Conclusion

There are many in New Jersey who have "Maryland Envy" and wish we had county school districts.

In terms of integration and tax fairness, the idea county school districts is impossible to argue with, but I think the ship of county school districts sailed 200 years ago.

However, I do think that NJ could still have some kind of county tax for school systems.

Failing that, we need to have an annual repportionment of state aid.  We would have to get to the point of consistent funding first, where every district has the same per student aid deficit relative to its SFRA target, but once we are at fairness, we could theoretically redistribute aid every year and give aid-losing districts a tax cap amendment to make up for the aid they would lose.

The annual reapportionment of county taxes shows that a town with a rising tax base can increase its taxes without an adverse effect.  Should an adverse real estate market effect develop because of high county taxes, the system is self-correcting and that town's Equalized Valuation will fall relative to its county neighbors and later county taxes will fall or be flat.

New Jersey is light-years from aid fairness, but if we ever arrive at a rational, fair distribution, we need not fear taking away aid from a thriving town so that it increases its tax levy.  What we should fear more is forcing a declining town to increase its taxes against the headwind of tax base decline.

Although making a town with a growing Equalized Valuation raise its school taxes would be bad for long-time residents whose incomes lag the growth of their property values, I think this is less bad than making property taxpayers pay more in taxes on properties whose values are eroding.  Forcing taxpayers with declining assets to pay more in taxes ultimately accelerates a spiral of decline which is in no one's interest.

So Two Cheers for County Taxes: one, because the capture taxes from all kinds of towns and two because they are flexible in a way other property taxes aren't.

May the functions of county governments grow!

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See Also:

The Loss of Property Wealth in NJ's Most Underaided Districts

The Divergent Fates of NJ's Big Cities




Wednesday, June 1, 2016

Only a Single Black Student in Hoboken's District Run Pre-K

Back in September 2015, Senators Mike Doherty (R) and Teresa Ruiz (D) argued over the merits of continuing Hoboken's Abbott status and its "free" Pre-K.

Doherty demanded an explanation for how the state could allow this injustice to persist:

Doherty made the point that the individuals in Hoboken have a median income of $69,000, compared to $29,000 in Hackettstown. And yet Hoboken, not Hackettstown, has a state paid-for pre-K program based on its designation as an Abbott School District.
“You could be a Wall Street executive and before you hop in your limo you could drop your child off at pre-school paid for by the taxpayers of Hackettstown”


In response, Teresa Ruiz said that Hoboken's Abbott status was justified because it had so many black and Latino students:

“How do we bridge our achievement gap?  How do we expand high optimal programs? Hoboken [when designated an Abbott District] was a different community than it is today. It’s nothing we’re going to figure out toda. Many Latino and African-American families needed to utilize those programs.”

Well, times have changed and there are few Hispanics anymore in Hoboken's Pre-K and almost no black students.

Out of 173 kids getting "free" Pre-K in Hoboken through the BOE, 139 are white.  I don't know if that counts as "lily white," but it's pretty damn close.  There are five kids who are biracial, nine who are Asian, and 17 who are Hispanic (who of course may be white and in Hoboken are rarely Spanish speaking.).

The original source of this is the DOE's Enrollment Files.

As part of the Abbott program there are also private Pre-K providers in Hoboken who operate with state money (ie, your money).  This option is more popular among Hoboken parents, with 596 students enrolled versus the only 173 enrolled in the school district's own Pre-K.  Presumably there are more black kids enrolled in the private Pre-K, but since that data isn't available publicly online, I can't say what its demographics are.

Click to Enlarge

This underscors the ridiculousness of David Sciarra's full-throated defense of Hoboken's Pre-K privileges in 2013, although then there were 10 black students and 42 Hispanic students out of 221.

NJ Legislature!  Update the Abbott list now!

HT: Dr. Anthony Petrosino for pointing this out to me.

Wednesday, May 25, 2016

The Abbott List Has Always Been Unfair


One theme of my blog is how the 31 Abbott districts aren't the 31 poorest districts in New Jersey.  The relevance of this argument is that by forcing the state to maintain Abbott aid privileges, the Education Law Center and New Jersey Supreme Court are exacerbating funding inequities by allowing less-poor Abbott districts to get tax relief and state benefits that New Jersey's poorest districts and poorest children don't get.

Some groups, like the Education Law Center, never acknowledge the unfairness of the Abbott list, but others acknowledge that unfairness exists but imply that the unfairness has only recently
Source, Star-Ledger: May 16, 1997

developed - often pointing to Hoboken and Jersey City's gentrification.

However, the unfairness and arbitrariness have always been there. The Abbott districts have, as a class, never represented New Jersey's poorest districts.

Yes, in 1990, most of the future Abbott districts were underequipped, understaffed, and had inadequate facilities, but so were numerous other non-Abbott districts.  Governor Jim Florio was rightfully deeply concerned about the divide between New Jersey's poorest and richest and thus in May 1990, proposed a law called the "Quality Education Act" that would have cut aid for affluent districts, made them pay for teacher pensions, raised taxes overall, and used the savings and tax increases to increase aid for all middle-income and poor districts.

Unlike the later Abbott regime, Florio's original Quality Education Act was sensitive to the state's budget situation and would have brought the poorest districts up the 60th percentile in spending, not to effectively the 90th percentile as the Abbott II decision ordered, but, critically,  Florio's original QEA also made no distinction between urban poor districts, suburban poor districts, and rural poor districts and treated all poor districts equally.

Unfortunately for the future of funding fairness, Chief Justice Robert Wilentz and the New Jersey Supreme Court intruded in June 1990 with the Abbott II decision, which gave special aid rights to urban poor districts that were not to be shared by non-urban poor districts or even many densely-populated small districts that any reasonable person would nonetheless consider urban.

Source, DOE, State Aid Summaries
The NJ Supreme Court constitutionalized special funding rights for a starkly-defined list of urban districts and thus superseded the original intentions of Jim Florio and overrode common sense.  Even if someone believes that an urban poor district is needier than an equally poor non-urban district, the Abbott approach created a sharp line between the 31st neediest district and the 32nd neediest district.  As Abbott privileges grew during the 1990s and the state's budget situation worsened after 2001, what was originally an aid ledge grew into an aid cliff.

An Obsolete List from the Start

The Education Law Center had gathered 20 figurehead plaintiffs for the Abbott lawsuit, one of whom, Raymond Abbott of Camden, gave his name to the lawsuit and the class of districts created from it.  The 20 student plaintiffs, however, only were from four districts.  The "Abbott Remedy" however, was meant to apply to all urban poor districts.  The NJ Supreme Court gave the legislature some leeway in what districts would receive the Abbott remedy, but it created the guidelines and gave its own list of what districts should receive the "Abbott Remedy."

The Abbott list may look arbitrary around its edges, but there was a method to its creation.  It was the
overlap of districts who had DFG A or B classification by the Department of Education and "urban" municipality classification by the Department of Community Affairs (minus Atlantic City).  The problems were that the source material was outdated and the classifications for DFG status and "urban municipality" status were themselves, inevitably, arbitrary.

Herein lies the obsolescence and unfairness of the Abbott list:

The DFG classification the Wilentz Court "used extensively" was made in 1984 and based on 1980 census data.  By the time the Abbott II case was written in 1990, the DFG classification had become out of date and there were certain districts who had fallen socioeconomically in the preceding decade and others who had risen.

Had the Abbott list been compiled after the update of the DFGs after the 1990 census and had the criteria for inclusion stayed the same, many plausibly urban districts would have been Abbottized.  North Bergen, Guttenberg, Kearny, Bayonne, Wallington, Carteret, Fairview, Dover, and Lakewood would have become Abbotts since by 1990 they were in DFG B whereas in the 1980s they were in in higher DFGs.  North Bergen had been in DFG C, Guttenberg had been in DFG E, Kearny had been in DFG C, Bayonne had been in DFG C, Wallington had been in DFG E, Carteret had in DFG C, Fairview had been in DFG C, Dover had been in DFG D, North Bergen had been in DFG C, Lakewood had been in DFG C.  (I got the old 1980s DFG classification through an OPRA request. I've put the list online.)


Chief Justice Robert Wilentz
believed it was better
to give massive aid
increases to a few districts
than smaller aid increases to
a greater number of districts.


Yet DFG classification was not the sole determinant of Abbott status. If it had been, the Abbotts might have just been all the districts in DFG A, but the NJ Supreme Court left off 35 (1980) DFG A districts, including impoverished/low-tax base towns including Buena Regional, Pinelands Regional, Bass River Township, East Newark, Paulsboro, and National Park Boro.

The second half of Abbottization was to have been classified as "urban" in early 1980s by the Department of Community Affairs.

The purpose of this Department of Community Affairs classification was originally to determine what municipalities could get special urban aid.  Since state aid was involved, the classification process was political, the definition expansive, and some towns were classified as "urban" a reasonable person would call "suburban" or "rural" such as Pemberton, Millville, and Howell.

There appear to have been size minima and public housing requirements for Department of Community Affairs "urban status," so very poor and relatively dense DFG A and B districts like Little Egg Harbor, Beverly City Woodlynne, Lawnside, National Park and East Newark were excluded from the Abbott list.  Since the NJ Supreme Court embedded the Department of Community Affairs list into Abbott classification, the Abbott list automatically excluded small districts.

(I have made OPRA requests of the Department of Community Affairs and Department of Education for the  1980s list "urban municipalities," but they say they do not have the list.  Nonetheless, the urban program still exists under the NJ Redevelopment Authority's "eligible municipalities."  Judge Wilentz said there were 56 towns on the list, but there are now 66.  Harrison (Hudson Cty) is off the list, so is West Orange, so there has been some change to it.)

Society was Never "Disintegrating" in Pemberton Township and Burlington City

In his sweeping Abbott II holding, Chief Justice Robert Wilentz had wrote that he was ordering money to urban poor districts because they are the districts where society is "failing abysmally, dramatically, and tragically."

He wrote the children of the Abbott districts:

live in poverty. Their cities have deteriorated and their lives are often bleak. They live in a culture where schools, studying, and homework are secondary. Their test scores, their dropout rate, their attendance at college, all indicate a severe failure of education. While education is largely absent from their lives, we get some idea of what is present from the crime rate, disease rate, drug addiction rate, teenage pregnancy rate, and the unemployment rate. 

Yet this description did not fit all of the "urban" towns that became Abbotts.

Journalism has always been sparse on the medium-sized Abbott districts, so this Philadelphia Inquirer article from 1990 about Burlington City and Pemberton, "Life On The List Of Poorest Schools," is fascinating because sheds rare light on how haphazard the Abbott list list was from the start.

Burlington City and Pemberton's own teachers, parents, and administrators rejected that Wilentz' belief that "society is failing" in Abbott districts applied to them:

But visits to schools in the Pemberton and Burlington districts, and interviews with teachers, administrators, students and parents there, found a different picture. Although everyone looked forward to the prospect of more money, hardly anyone said the two school systems were so bad off they needed the state to come running to the rescue. 
"I am certain that nobody thought about Burlington City when they made this ruling," said Carl Johnson, assistant superintendent in that district. ''We'd love to have the money, and we need to stop asking our taxpayers for it . . . but I don't feel we're an impoverished district." [my emphasis]

According to the Inquirer article, in 1990, Burlington City was "mildly depressed urban area," but was able to spend above the state's average and had a declining student population, so hardly one of acute need. Pemberton Township was entirely rural to a reasonable observer, had stable families and lacked the "environment of violence, poverty and despair" that Wilentz said dominated in the seven cities that he did purport to study.
Both Burlington City and Pemberton's officials welcomed more money, but they disagreed that they were providing anything other than a "thorough and efficient education." 
"We're included in this decision because there's a limit on our (taxable property) and because of the demographics of the town," said Johnson, Burlington's assistant superintendent. "This is not based on our performance or the education we provide."

In justifying why Wilentz was excluding so many poor districts from the "Abbott Remedy," Wilentz said of the other DFG A and B districts "their socioeconomic status is not as compelling; furthermore, there is no direct substantive evidence on this record of their failure to provide a thorough and efficient education."

Society wasn't failing in Pemberton and Burlington City and neither were the school districts.
In Pemberton, administrators took offense at the suggestion that their academic performance was sub-standard. "The thing about us," said High School No. 2 principal Robert Holmes, "is that we do a lot with a little."
A few statistics illustrate the gap between the academic programs in the deeply depressed city schools, and at Pemberton and Burlington.
At Camden's Woodrow Wilson High, for instance, the dropout rate was 58 percent, according to a 1980 state study; at Newark's Central High, the rate was 55 percent. At Pemberton, last year's official dropout rate was 5.3 percent; Burlington City's rate was 3.7 percent - better than the state average of 4.9 percent. 
Last year in Jersey City high schools, 54.6 percent of freshmen passed the state-mandated math proficiency exam, which all students must pass before they can graduate; in Camden the passing rate was 53.6 percent. At Burlington City last year, 87.3 percent passed the math exam; at Pemberton, 84.2 percent passed.

Robert Wilentz had said in Abbott II decision that "Thorough and efficient means ...the ability to
Abbottist Reasoning:
If you've seen seven Abbotts
you've seen 'em all,
so one size fits all. 
participate fully in society, in the life of one's community, the ability to appreciate music, art, and literature, and the ability to share all of that with friends."  Wilentz wrote and yet one Burlington City mom was very proud that Burlington City already offered art and music.

"You can't equate us with Moorestown, it's true, but you can't equate us with Camden either. Our school system is excellent in my mind. The kids have music once a week, and art once a week, and there are computers in all the classrooms. We don't lack for anything."

Burlington City was not the only future Abbott to have above-average spending, in fact, only 22 of the future-Abbotts were below average in spending. (see Star-Ledger, "CAMPBELL KEEPS EYE ON SCHOOL AID DEBATE," October 9, 1989)

The reason that Wilentz language didn't fit Pemberton and Burlington City is that Wilentz and the New Jersey Supreme Court never studied Pemberton and Burlington City.  Their whole research was focused on only the seven most impoverished districts: Camden, Trenton, East Orange, Irvington, Jersey City, Newark and Paterson. Wilentz then just made an assumption that the (then) other 21 districts shared the same characteristics.

we have absolutely no doubt, based on the record, that the twenty-eight urban districts that are the subject of our remedy share the educational characteristics and problems of the seven urban districts mentioned above."



The fact that Wilentz and the NJ Supreme Court only studied seven of the Abbotts reveals another fiscal injustice of Wilentz' "Parity Plus" doctrine since the "remedy" that might have been necessary for Newark wasn't necessary for Pemberton.

Hoboken Should Never Have Been an Abbott

Pemberton and Burlington City should not have become Abbotts based on demographics.  Hoboken's students, on the other hand, probably qualified demographically based on pure poverty percentages, but there were proportionally very few of them relative to Hoboken's $1.6 billion tax base and had more up-to-date data been available, Hoboken would probably have been excluded from the Abbott list.

In the 1980s Hoboken had very low performing schools, but Hoboken's tax base was already strong and its schools well funded.  In 1989 Hoboken had a 1.11 school tax rate, which was not even among New Jersey's 100 highest.

First, even at its rock bottom, Hoboken was never a demographic or tax-base peer of Newark, Paterson, or even Jersey City.

Hoboken always had a non-Hispanic white majority and as early as the 1970s, Hoboken was gentrifying.

In 1975, the New York Times characterized Hoboken as "a blue collar town that lures professionals from Manhattan."  Hoboken had social problems on its south side, but its mayor said "but middle class people are coming in, property values are rising, capital is being invested and we are on the verge of turning things around."  [source, NYT Historical]

Even in 1979, before gentrification became intense (or the word "gentrification" was used), Hoboken's schools were well funded with local tax dollars and state aid.

As City Councilman Robert Ranieri said to the New York Times in 1979:

"The educational system is wrong. It's well-financed by taxes and by the state, but we do not produce a good product." Our students constantly test out much lower than the state levels.  Why?  I'll tell you why."  [source, NYT Historical]
Ranieri believed the problem was corruption:

"Politics has been the mainstay of the school system for 40 years. The chief administrative jobs have always been political plums, and that does not lend itself to a good educational system."

Hoboken's gentrification heated up in the 1980s.  By 1985, managing growth and affordability was the dominant issue in the mayoral election.
OF the many issues in last spring's mayoral election campaign in Hoboken, none was as crucial as the city's unparalleled record of revitalization.
Voters turned out Steven Cappiello, who for a dozen years had scrambled to replace outdated factories and rundown tenements with new condominiums. In his place they elected Thomas R. Vezzetti, who shouted through a bullhorn on street corners that uncontrolled growth had displaced residents and benefited the rich at the expense of the poor.

By 1987, the New York Times covered a fight between yuppies (using that word) and working class Italians over the use of fireworks during Italian festivals and referred to Hoboken's "dramatic, painful gentrification."  The Times said Hoboken was "once predominantly [a] blue-collar city.

By 1990 the NYTimes could write of a Hoboken "a city that indeed has been transformed. Where boarded-up storefronts stood, there are fancy boutiques. Tenements have been demolished and replaced by expensive condominiums."  [my emphasis]

During the 1970s Hoboken's population fell by over 3,000 due to displacement and from 1980 to 1990 that process accelerated.  Despite Hoboken's condominium boom, its population fell by over 9,000 from to 42,460 to 33,397.

In 1980, 28% of Hoboken residents were under 18, but by 1990 only 16% were and the overall population was 25% smaller.   Hoboken's population of residents under 18 thus fell from over 7,000 to 3,500 (it would fall farther still in the 1990s).  Certainly Hoboken still had problems in 1990, but an inadequate tax base was not one of them.  (Source for demographics, 1980 Census)

Indeed, according to that NYTimes article, the yuppies found the Hoboken school system lacking and were impatient that gentrification wasn't total, but no one cited a lack of funds for the system.

By 1990, Hoboken still had grime, but had very strong real estate demand and a constant stream of young professionals moving in:
Even as some families leave, real-estate values remain high, though there is a glut of new condominiums and prices have leveled off in the last year, as in much of the metropolitan region. On the side streets off Washington Street, the main strip lined with sidewalk cafes, restaurants and fancy shops, brownstones that sold 15 years ago for $30,000 are now worth $300,000, Over the last 15 months, 1,500 new studio, one- and two-bedroom condominiums have come on the market and have attracted another new population of young professionals to this once predominantly blue-collar city.


Education Law Center: Abbott Reform Never!

One reason the Abbott list was so unfair at its edges is that the Abbott II decision came out in early June and the legislature has to finalize the budget by June 30th.  Abbott II's implementation legislation, a modified Quality Education Act and its significant tax, pension, and aid changes, was thus passed in a four week legislative blitzkrieg that violated multiple norms of democratic government and quickly became the most hated law in modern New Jersey history.
Abbott Lawyer David Sciarra on
SFRA:
"a major setback for children in both the
high-poverty, urban districts"

The legislature added Plainfield  and Neptune Township (then DFG C) to the Abbott list, bringing the total to 30, but made no deletions from the list that Judge Wilentz had suggested.

By the mid-2000s, after years of flat-aid for non-Abbotts, there was some loose talk from Republicans of removing Garfield, Burlington City, Pemberton, Gloucester City, Millville,Vineland, Harrison, Hoboken, Jersey City, Long Branch, Neptune Township, and Phillipsburg from the Abbott list since by the mid-2000s they either had decent tax bases, their students were not among NJ's poorest, or both.

Yet to this moderate proposal that continued Abbott spending for the poorer Abbotts, the Education Law Center screamed "NO."

"It would also roll back historic gains in educating thousands of poor and minority children, and bring back New Jersey’s shameful period of education inequality."

In 2007, when the Corzine administration was contemplating the aid reform package that eventually became SFRA, David Sciarra of the Education Law Center said that Hoboken could be removed from the Abbott list, as long as nothing substantial changed: "The Legislature could remove Hoboken from Abbott, but it must have a plan in place to continue those educational reforms." (meaning Pre-K)

Predictably, the Abbott list was unchanged and Hoboken retained its Abbott status.  Instead, the Corzine administration and NJ legislature ignored NJ's budget and pension problems and (with some exaggeration) Abbottized all poor and working-class districts.

Even though SFRA was an attempt to help districts who were as poor as almost as poor as non-Abbotts the Education Law Center stood athwart justice yelling "STOP." David Sciarra called SFRA "a major setback for children in both the high-poverty, urban districts but also in the higher-spending districts." Sciarra said that in September 2008 that SFRA was forcing cuts in the Abbott districts, but when asked to name a specific cut, he could not.

The Abbott List was Created Unfair and Has Become More Unfair Ever Since, When Will the State Do Taxpayers and Poor Non-Abbotts Justice?

Wilentz was wrong about many things, but he was especially wrong to have "absolutely no doubt, based on the record" that all the Abbott districts merited the same remedy that Camden, Trenton, East Orange, Irvington, Jersey City, Newark and Paterson did.  Perhaps most of the other 21 Abbott districts - like Bridgeton, Perth Amboy, Passaic, Elizabeth, West New York, and Asbury Park - could be classed with Camden, Trenton etc, but not Long Branch, Neptune, Pemberton, Burlington City, or Hoboken.  It was unjust to exclude some of New Jersey's poorest communities (Buena, Pinelands Regional, Woodlynne, East Newark, Fairfield etc) because they were too small to be classified as "urban" on a list whose qualifications were inevitably arbitrary.

Abbottism from
Jaynee LaVecchia
in Abbott XXI (2011):
The state's ability to pay for
Abbott is irrelevant to
its constitutional
obligation to do so.
Had the Abbott II court case been decided after the 1990 census, Pemberton and Neptune would not have been Abbotts because they were classified in DFG CD after 1990.  

The critics of Robert Wilentz always objected to the fact that he lived on the Upper East Side (of Manhattan).  Wilentz' defenders said his residence was irrelevant, but perhaps it was since had Wilentz known New Jersey better, perhaps he would not have advised treating Pemberton the same as Newark.

Given that the Abbott list has become even more unfair in the last few years, the Education Law Center's threats to sue the state again over Abbott construction money and K-12 aid must be seen as reactionary moves that would foil justice, not advance it.  

Although I'm no fan of the NJ Supreme Court, responsibility to update the Abbott list is the legislature's and the executive branch's.  When will they even try?



Tsar Robert I of New Jersey 


Wednesday, March 30, 2016

Sweeney, Beck Propose Help for NJ's Neediest Districts


Senators Stephen Sweeney and Jennifer Beck continue to work on legislation that would redistribute state aid away from overaided districts to districts that are underaided and truly needy.

In an article by Adam Clark that appeared on the cover of the Sunday, March 27th Star-Ledger, Beck and Sweeney explained:

"The hold harmless provision [Adjustment Aid] was meant to make sure there was no losers," state Senate President Stephen Sweeney said. "It absolutely created losers." [my emphasis]
Sweeney (D-Gloucester) and Sen. Jenifer Beck (R-Monmouth) are finalizing a plan that they say would make school funding more equitable. Beginning in 2017-18, the proposal would gradually phase out hold harmless aid [ie, Adjustment Aid] for districts that don't need it and reallocate that money to growing districts that are underfunded, Beck said.

Political Courage

This is truly a brave move on both senators' parts. Both Sweeney and Beck have some overaided districts among their constituents who may oppose any redistribution and this bill faces an uphill struggle through ignorance, selfishness, and parochialism of the legislature.  Remember, SFRA barely passed in 2008 and it was an aid increase (even overaided districts were supposed to gain 2%), not an aid redistribution.

Not to overpraise Sweeney (who I criticized here for talking Pre-K expansion without having a way to pay for it), but I see him as a truly bold politician.  Between being the primary Democratic backer of pension reform, supporting the consolidation of K-8s with their regional high schools, and now state aid reform, Sweeney is someone who is willing to take stances that offend interest groups and some of his own constituents if he believes they are correct.  A sincere bravo to him on this.

Conditioning Aid Distribution on Adequacy = Inadequate Redistribution

Sweeney and Beck haven't released any details of their plan yet, but there are hints that they will consider where districts are relative to their Adequacy budgets.

According to the Adam Clark Star Ledger article:

The districts that would receive less hold harmless money are already "above adequacy," meaning they spend more money per student than the state's funding formula says is needed for a thorough and efficient education, Beck said. Those districts should be able to adjust their budgets, especially if their enrollment has dropped, she said.

Any redistribution of Adjustment Aid is a good thing, but if New Jersey only takes Adjustment Aid away from districts that are above Adequacy the amount of Adjustment Aid that could be redistributed is greatly reduced because 71 Adjustment Aid districts undertax so significantly that they actually below Adequacy.  Important examples of Adjustment Aid districts that are below Adequacy are Jersey City, Brick, and Toms River.

According to the Education Law Center Policy Brief on Adjustment Aid, for 2015-16:

  • The above Adequacy Adjustment Aid districts get $174,024,179 in Adjustment Aid.
  • The below Adequacy Adjustment Aid districts get $381,745,553 in Adjustment Aid.

So, if Adequacy is considered then the potential amount of Adjustment Aid that could be redistributed is only $174 million, not the full $550 million that the state labels as "Adjustment Aid."
(NJ hasn't run the SFRA formula in several years and the amount of money that districts get that is labeled "Adjustment Aid" is divorced from the amount of Adjustment Aid they should get.  For instance, Newark and Atlantic City both get something called "Adjustment Aid," but both are underaided and the Adjustment Aid should be converted into Equalization Aid.  Conversely, since Jersey City increasingly becomes richer and its student population grows slowly, more of its Equalization Aid should be converted to Adjustment Aid.)

Also, the Adjustment Aid districts that are above Adequacy are often only slightly above Adequacy, meaning that because they undertax, their aid excesses are greater than their surpluses above Adequacy.

For instance, even though Pemberton gets $32 million in Adjustment Aid, it is only above Adequacy by $14 million.

  • Asbury Park gets $24.2 million in Adjustment Aid, but is only $13.9 million above Adequacy.  
  • Keansburg gets $8.6 million in Adjustment Aid, but is only $5.9 million above Adequacy.  
  • Phillipsburg is gets $10 million in Adjustment Aid, but is only $125,000 above Adequacy.  

Adam Clark writes about this as a "bipartisan plan to change how that money — more than $500 million — is allocated" but if only Adjustment Aid districts that are above Adequacy lose aid, the amount that could be redistributed would be nowhere near $500 million.

Population Change isn't the Only Factor in Overaiding and Underaiding

Another concern I have is that redistribution will be overly conditioned on population changes.  Although Sweeney and Beck haven't released any details yet, Jennifer Beck has talked often about aid being taken from districts that have lost population and giving it to districts that have gained population.

"The bottom line is that we as a state have not allowed our methodology for funding to keep up with what's actually happening at a district," Beck said. "If you've lost 100 students and the state of New Jersey is giving you the same state aid as you had five years ago... there should be some cost savings along the way."
And, in a statement at a recent Senate budget hearing Beck said:

"According to Beck, school funding needs to be redistributed throughout the state so that districts that have lost enrollment are not getting funding above the adequacy standard at the expense of schools where enrollment has increased. She said that that issue is not only central to the discussion in Paterson, but in a number of schools statewide including those in Asbury Park and Freehold, both of which fall in her district."


I'm a fan of Jennifer Beck, but I do not think she has it totally right about the causation of overaiding and underaiding.

Some districts in New Jersey have always been overaided or always been underaided, even before any recent population shifts.  For many districts, it is difficult to say why they have always been privileged or always been victimized, but it's not like NJ ever was "on formula" for a lot of districts who are now underaided.  




What logic was there ever in giving Marlboro twice as much aid per student as Bloomfield? What on earth justified giving Hillsborough more money than Belleville? Why did Randolph get more money than Hackensack?

Freehold Boro (then DFG CD), whose population growth has been often cited in its underaiding, only got $3,153 per student in 1998-1999, which is not significantly more than what Hillsborough got.

The aid distribution has been unjust for a very long time.  

I am worried that Beck neglects causes of overaiding and underaiding other than population change. Although Asbury Park and Pemberton's extraordinary overaiding are partly due to population loss and the zombie power the Abbott "Parity Plus" Doctrine, there are other districts that are overaided because they have had increases in wealth.

Hoboken and Jersey City represent two districts that are overaided despite gaining population.

Increase in wealth is difficult to quantify because historic Local Fair Share data is not available and even if it were available I would have to adjust it for inflation, but I can use Equalized Valuation (as a percentage of statewide EV) to show that Hoboken (an extreme, but illustrative example) has become overaided because of an increase in wealth, not because it has lost student population (on the contrary, it's slightly growing.)




Were I to go back even farther the effect would be more dramatic.  In the late 1990s Hoboken had only 0.3% of the state's total Equalized Valuation.   (see Divergent Fates of NJ's Big Cities.)

Likewise, some underaided districts haven't had much population change either.  Perhaps they were always underaided, or their population has stayed constant but become poorer.  They could also have seen a decline in ratables.

Atlantic City would be a prime (if extreme) example of a district who was once overaided (hence the Adjustment Aid artifact) and whose population has actually fallen, but has become deeply underaided (-$6,770 per student) because it has had an enormous decrease in wealth.


Will Anything Change?

Sweeney and Beck themselves have said that their proposal will be controversial, but the moral arguments for redistribution are so strong that I have some hope that this legislation will at least pass the State Senate.

The big question marks are the Education Law Center, Vincent Prieto, and Chris Christie.

The Education Law Center, led by lawyer David Sciarra, has opposed redistribution in the past and I consider it to be reactionary and economically blind, but in the fall of 2015 it softened its opposition to cutting Adjustment Aid for districts that were above Adequacy.  The ELC is influential among Democratic legislators and NJ's education activist community, so its support would help tip the scales in favor of justice.

As recently as 2012, Christie, through Chris Cerf's Education Funding Report, supported cutting Adjustment Aid too for districts that are above Adequacy.  Christie actually followed through on this for two years before setting into a flat-aid policy.  Christie, obviously, has become erratic and no one knows what he would think of redistribution.  He even created "Additional Adjustment Aid" to protect Interdistrict Choice districts from ever losing aid.

Prieto is a big unknown. All of Prieto's constituents - East Newark, Edgewater, Fairview, Guttenberg, Harrison, Kearny, North Bergen, Secaucus, and West New York - are underaided, but Prieto is also a close ally of Jersey City and Hoboken politicians whose districts are overaided.  Prieto is known to be a backer of Steve Fulop too and may not want to do Steve Sweeney any favors.



Anyway, I appreciate what Sweeney and Back are trying to do and look forward to learning more about their proposal.

Thursday, March 3, 2016

Help for the Needless: New Jersey's Richest Districts and Their State Aid


This post is the first in a series where I examine tax and Local Fair Share data for 2016-17.  This post will identify New Jersey's richest school districts, based on total Local Fair Share and Local Fair Share per student and demonstrate that most of these districts receive considerable state aid that they have no economic need for.  The conclusion is that these ultra-high resource districts' aid should be redistributed to truly disadvantaged districts.

Local Fair Share is the state's way of evaluating what taxes a district should be capable of paying in order to support its schools.  Local Fair Share is half of the calculation of Equalization Aid, the state's major stream of aid.

The formula for Local Fair Share depends on Equalized Valuation and on Aggregate Income.

The exact formula for 2016-17 is:

(Equalized Valuation x 0.013156218 + Aggregate Income x 0.046185507)/2

Equalized Valuation is the market value of all the taxable real property in a town.  Aggregate Income is the total income of the residents, although there is a three year lag in what year aggregate income is from.  For FY2017 the state is using Aggregate Income from 2013.

Local Fair Share is not confidential, but it is not published either.  I got these data by making an OPRA request of the DOE.

The definition of "richest" I am using in this post is "tax base per student." These districts do not have New Jersey's highest average incomes, nor lowest FRL-eligible rates, nor highest school spending.  By using the word "richest," I'm intentionally being provocative, but it's high time that some high-FRL districts like Hoboken accept that they are in fact rich on a per student basis.

New Jersey's highest-resource districts tend to be demographically unusual places like Hoboken and Jersey Shore microdistricts that have very high property valuations and very few children.  The few conventionally affluent districts among the richest are Alpine, Harding, and Bedminster.

As usual, I will look at state aid for these districts and show that state aid for these districts is unneeded and must be redistributed in the era of the pension crisis.

Without further ado, here goes:

These 38 districts are all the districts with more than $35,000 in Local Fair Share per student.

The Red column is the actual Local Tax Levy.

Avalon Boro, with $1.3 million in Local Fair Share per student, is the highest resource in New Jersey.  It taxes itself at 6% of Local Fair Share, but still yields over $70,000 per student.

If you examine the chart, you'll see that these are mostly tiny districts.  Of these districts, only Franklin Lakes (1,083 students), Ocean City (1,447), and Hoboken (2,596) have more than 1,000 students.  According to the figures I got from the Department of Education for estimated 2016 population, these 38 districts in total only have 12,258 students.



Helping the Needless

Unevenness of economic resources is to be expected, but what is outrageous about the situation in New Jersey is that these ultra-high resource districts get considerable state aid. The 38 richest districts get $28,555,176 in K-12 state aid, plus another $11.3 million for Pre-K in Hoboken.

23 of NJ's 38 districts with more than $35,000 per student in Local Fair Share get over $1,000 per student.

Seven of NJ's districts with more than $35,000 in Local Fair Share per student get over $3,646 per student state aid median.



I've said numerous times on this blog that New Jersey must redistribute Adjustment Aid.  I believe that the fairest method to redistribute aid is to take Adjustment Aid from overaided districts, and I make no exceptions for overaided districts with high FRL-eligibility, such as Jersey City, Pemberton, and Asbury Park.

However, another source of aid to responsibly redistribute is to take all aid away from New Jersey's wealthiest districts.  The amount of aid NJ's highest-resource districts get is in the tens of millions of dollars.  When for 2016-17 the state can only find an additional $19 million for Equalization Aid we have to look at the money the least-needy districts are getting and put it where the need is the most acute and it will do the most good.

---

See Also:


Helping the Needless: New Jersey's Richest Districts and Their State Aid

The Robbers and the Robbed: State Aid Disparities for 2016-17

Choice Districts, Charterized Districts Are Big Winners for 2016-17 State Aid

More on 2016-17 State Aid: Where the Money's Going