Showing posts with label pension crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label pension crisis. Show all posts

Friday, March 3, 2017

New Jersey=Debtors' Prison: The 2017-18 Budget

Note, this post was accurate at the time it was written regarding flat-funding for K-12 operating aid.  In June 2017 Steve Sweeney pushed through a deal that did increase K-12 aid by $100 million, PreK by $25 million, and Extraordinary Aid by another $25 million.   See this update on disparities for a look after Sweeney's last-minute changes.

Everything in this post I say about categories of debt getting the lion's share of new money remains still accurate. 


The Garden State
For 2017-18 K-12 state operating aid for school districts is increasing by a measly $3,140,585, all of which is going for Interdistrict Choice and Host District Stabilization Aid for Newark.

Of New Jersey's 577 school districts, only 91 are receiving any aid increase at all.

Even New Jersey's most savagely underaided districts, like Manchester Regional, Freehold Boro, East Newark, Chesterfield are gaining nothing.  Bound Brook, who was the most underaided school district for 2016-17, is getting a $6,387 boost, which is for perhaps another Interdistrict Choice student.

Atlantic City, which had lost another $2 billion in Equalized Valuation, gained nothing other than $60,881 for Interdistrict Choice.  This is a contrast to last year, when Atlantic City gained $32 million last year for "Commercial Valuation Stabilization Aid."

Since state aid for 2016-17 was $8,031,337,333, the increase is an imperceptible 4 one-thousandths of a percent.  2016-17 was a bad year too, but at least in that year K-12 aid increased by $90 million.

Yet there is more to this story than just the headline aid increase of $3,140,585 and that untold story is large increases for New Jersey's debt.


  • TPAF funding is increasing by $411 million.  
  • Post-retirement medical funding for teachers is increasing by $69.9 million.
  • Debt Service on Christie Whitman's Pension Obligation Bonds is increasing by $15.4 million.
  • Debt service aid (which goes directly to districts) is increasing by $17.4 million.  

State Debt Servicing, which is for the bonds the Economic Development Authority floated for (mostly Abbott) construction is increasing by $20.5 million from $898.3 million to $918.8 million.

New Jersey's expenses for teachers Social Security is actually falling.  Perhaps this is due the 2016-17 budget cuts meaning that there are now fewer teachers?

Because TPAF and other education debt expenses increased so much, education spending (broadly defined as opex aid and other education-related expenses) is now 39% of the state budget versus only 31% of the budget in 2001. (FY2018 = $13.8 billion out of $35.5 billion)

Click to Enlarge.
Source, pg 41
http://www.nj.gov/treasury/omb/publications/18bib/BIB.pdf


And for comparison's sake, here is where the increase for 2016-17 went.  (the graph refers to "proposed increases," but these proposed increases actually were implemented.)

As you can see, it's the same story.






Monday, May 9, 2016

NJ's Pension System was Always Unsustainable

One thing that bugs me about attempts to explain the causes of NJ's pension catastrophe is that they are never deeper than "the governors raided the pension funds," with the accused governors being
every governor from Whitman forwards or every governor from Florio forwards.

This guest column in the Star-Ledger "6 N.J. governors, including Chris Christie, are to blame for state's pension crisis" by Sean Rutherford represents this kind of thinking:
As a teacher, I have contributed every dime I was supposed to into my pension. Yet, for some reason our state government hasn’t. Where did this all start? Gov. Christine Todd Whitman. She took office in 1994 and decided that in order to achieve a balanced state budget, as required by law, she would reduce the amount of money contributed to the pension fund. In 1997, she decided the state should borrow $2.75 billion from the fund and use it elsewhere. As time went on, she contributed a mere fraction of what was necessary to replace those funds and meet the needs of the pension system. For the next half decade, the state as a whole contributed an average of $23 million per year. The calculations and formulas showed the state should have contributed an average of $600 million per year to keep up with the demand. This trend continued with each new governor that took office: Donald DiFrancesco, James McGreevey, Richard Codey, Jon Corzine, and our current governor, Chris Christie.

Ok, the above has sections which are factually not true.  Pension underfunding began with Florio, not Whitman (see left).  Whitman didn't borrow $2.75 from the funds, she borrowed $2.75 for the funds in order to invest that money in the stock market and earn a better return.  It was a move that the public sector unions at the time supported.

It's true in a superficial sense that NJ's governors starting with Florio or Whitman made inadequate pension contributions, but it ignores the political pressures our governors were under and the roles of the NJ Supreme Court through its Abbott mandate and the venality of the legislature.  The unions themselves in bringing New Jersey to insolvency through their demands for even more generous pensions and the lack of taxpayer organization to defeat them.

Source:
1990 Budget Facts
https://tinyurl.com/yc9obxdr
Anyway, what the "governors raided the funds" argument misses the critical fact that NJ's pension funds were always unsustainable.  In order to exist, NJ's pension funds required two things of uncertain dependability.

1.  An ever-growing state economy.
2.  An ever-growing teacher corps in order to increase employee contributions.

As we know, neither of the preceding is guaranteed.

People in the 1980s and 1990s knew that pension costs were growing faster than inflation.  During the Kean administration, the cost of NJ government doubled, but pension costs tripled.




Anyway, I wanted to share this letter to the editor from 1990 with you.  In the letter a resident of Maplewood, NJ writes that Governor Florio's attempt to pay for Abbott by offloading pension responsibilities to 220 affluent and middle-class districts would lead to disaster.  The writer aptly calls the pension system a "ticking time bomb."






Thursday, March 24, 2016

Your Number of the Day: -6.61%

-6.61%

It's the percentage of value the NJ pension funds lost through February 2016.

http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/16/03/23/many-happy-returns-alternative-investments-buoy-public-employee-pension-plan/

NJ's pension funds are actuarially assumed to return 7.9% annually.  This 7.9% is what Moody's used when it estimated that NJ's pension funds would start zeroing-out in 2021.  If NJ doesn't meet the 7.9% return then the funds start zeroing-out even sooner and state aid is gutted even sooner.

This comes a few days after Standard & Poor's lowered its outlook for NJ from stable to negative.

Monday, November 2, 2015

New Jersey Out-Dysfunctions Illinois, Has Country's Worst Credit


From Bury Pensions:

Credit risk this time and according to The Bond Buyer teaser:


Despite last week’s downgrades, Illinois’ general obligation paper fares better than New Jersey for relative credit risk, Municipal Market Analytics (MMA) said in a commentary comparing the two lowest-rated states.

Crain’s Chicago Business (CCB) also got a copy of the MMA report and, though the headline implied a toss-up, the excerpts included in their story clearly show why New Jersey deserves its rank:


For Illinois vs. New Jersey, Municipal Market Analytics asks: Is it better to own the general obligation bonds of a state in the middle of a budget impasse (Illinois) or the bonds of a state with a budget that only contributes to the “continued deterioration of its finances”? 
The answer is Illinois, especially because payments on New Jersey bonds require continuing appropriations by the Legislature, while Illinois law makes bond payments automatic.

That may be the answer CCB wants but how could any investor feel secure knowing the New Jersey Legislature has a say in whether they get paid?


“In the near to medium term, we are bearish on the finances of both states as they are facing significant challenges and doing an admirable job making them worse,” the report says.
…..
Illinois has fewer legal options to cut pensions and retiree health care benefits, but it does have the capacity to raise revenues, the report says. New Jersey has more “theoretical ability” to reduce those costs, but the “state’s high tax burden diminishes its flexibility,” according to the report.
I can't keep saying this again, NJ is f****d.  We can never fully fund SFRA.

The gist of the comparison between Illinois and NJ is that Illinois has fewer legal options to shed pension debt, but since Illinois' taxes are not yet as high as New Jersey's, Illinois has a greater ability to raise taxes.

New Jersey cannot raise taxes as much as Illinois could, but its pension reform hasn't been gutted yet, so it might be able to reduce some of its pension obligations.

If the NJ Supreme Court guts pension reform like Illinois' Supreme Court did then New Jersey will be in a different league than Illinois in the tightness of its fiscal vise.

Unfortunately the Education Law Center has NO CLUE how bad New Jersey's fiscal position is.  Last week they sent a letter to the Attorney General demanding that New Jersey borrow billions more to pay for more construction in the Abbott districts.

Tuesday, October 13, 2015

Education Law Center Report on Adjustment Aid Has Significant Errors, Shows Usual Education Law Center Blindspots


The Education Law Center has just released a policy brief on Adjustment Aid that attempts to defend this aid stream, clear up what it believes are misconceptions about Adjustment Aid, and assert the Department of Education of miscalculating Adjustment Aid.


I will use the Education Law Center's own summary of what Adjustment Aid is:


What is adjustment aid?

In January 2008, the NJ Legislature passed the School Funding Reform Act (SFRA), putting into law a new school funding formula. In order to ease the transition for districts that would receive less state aid under the SFRA, the formula included adjustment aid to hold districts harmless at pre-SFRA state aid levels. Under the law, districts would receive adjustment aid if their 2008-09 SFRA state aid allocation was less than their state aid level in 2007-08.

Adjustment aid was intended to steadily decrease over time. Districts receiving adjustment aid would be flat-funded until their adequacy budgets – the amount of resources determined to be necessary to provide a “thorough and efficient” education under the new formula – grew to the point where equalization aid, which is the wealth-equalized state portion of the adequacy budget, and other SFRA categorical aids replaced the “excess” adjustment aid.

In other words, if a district received $20 million before SFRA became law and SFRA's new aid formulas indicate it demographically and economically needs $18 million, that district would get $18 million in formula aid and then $2 million in "Adjustment Aid."

What the Education Law Center didn't point out is that Adjustment Aid ensured that SFRA was not a redistribution of state aid, since Adjustment Aid made it all-but impossible for a district to lose aid. Underaided districts - usually poor-non-Abbotts - were supposed to gain 10-20% per year in aid under SFRA, but that money had to come from new money for SFRA, not a redistribution from overaided districts.


This reliance on new money is SFRA's fatal flaw.  New money is the air SFRA breathes.  Without new revenue SFRA is a fantasy, not a real, operating law.  Since Christie's becoming governor in 2010, there has been no new money poured into SFRA and SFRA's promise to underaided poor districts like Belleville, Clifton, Freehold Boro, and Woodlynne has been empty. 


Because many acutely underaided districts have not been helped by SFRA, there have been some sporadic criticism of Adjustment Aid and a request that some of it be redistributed to underaided districts.  The most significant criticism and proposal about Adjustment Aid was Chris Cerf's proposal in 2012 to cut Adjustment Aid in half for districts Above Adequacy.  

To this request for redistribution the Education Law Center stands athwart common sense yelling "STOP!"


What is strange about the Education Law Center's defense of Adjustment Aid is that their new report actually contains a lot of damning information about Adjustment Aid.

The Education Law Center's own report discloses and then ignores the anti-progressive tendencies in Adjustment Aid.  


Table 4 presents the distribution of adjustment aid if the formula were fully funded and used a base year of 2014-15. [See Appendix A for district level data.] The total adjustment aid amount is $578 million. The aid is distributed across all types of districts: $216 million would be allocated to 14 former Abbott districts, and $362 million would be provided to 183 non-Abbotts; $237 million would be provided to 33 low wealth districts, $275 million to 120 middle wealth districts, and $45 million to 20 high wealth districts; $300 million would be allocated to 138 over adequacy districts, and $275 million to 50 below adequacy districts.1 

So, 33 "low wealth" districts would receive Adjustment Aid if SFRA were fully funded and the formulas correctly run.  How many low wealth districts would not receive Adjustment Aid?  The Education Law Center does not consider this, but there are a total of 104 districts in DFG A and B, so 71 get nothing.  If Adjustment Aid were rechanneled into other aid streams these non-Adjustment Aid districts like Freehold Boro, Dover, Prospect Park, Haledon, and Bound Brook would gain.  




The Education Law Center also makes an even more surprising mistake by conflating low-wealth districts with low-DFG districts.  Although usually low-DFG districts are also low-resource, there are some significant exceptions and these exceptions are the ones that receive Adjustment Aid.


Jersey City is the most important exception.  Jersey City is in DFG B, so it would count as a "low wealth" district in the Education Law Center's classification, but Jersey City's Local Fair Share is $336 million for 2015-16, about $10,000 a student, which is at the state's average  Partly because of the $114 million Jersey City gets in Adjustment Aid, it could enjoy a tax levy at $110 million for 2014-15, an amount below what much smaller cities like Clifton and West Orange must pay.

Likewise, there are many Adjustment Aid districts at the Jersey Shore with low or middle DFG classifications that have high levels of taxable wealth.  Upper Township is in DFG B, but it has $19,000 in Local Fair Share per student, an amount higher than Montclair's, a district the ELC would label "High Wealth" because it is in DFG I.  Upper Township would get  $5,448,392 in Adjustment Aid even in the ELC's alternative calculations.

Jersey Shore Districts tend to do very well in Adjustment Aid.  Cape May districts would get $29.7 million.  Atlantic County districts get $9.3 million.  Most of the districts getting Adjustment Aid on the Jersey Shore have good tax bases.  Sometimes the Adjustment Aid is absurd.  Is it progressive to give $21,873 to the four students of Allenhurst, another one of NJ's ultra-high resource towns?  

Rural districts do very well too.  13 out of 24 Warren County districts get Adjustment Aid, most of which have high DFGs,  Under the ELC's alternative calculations Warren County districts would get $12.3 million.  

By contrast, Bergen County districts (total) would only get $4.6 million.  Union County districts would get $0.  Essex County districts would only get $14 million, nearly all of which would go to East Orange.

Big Bucks for Hoboken

Then there is Hoboken, which appears in everything ridiculous in New Jersey's aid distribution.

Hoboken's real Local Fair Share is $186 million  for 2015-16 (an amount far in excess of its Adequacy Budget) for 2,600 students.  That's over $70,000 per student, meaning Hoboken could have an exceptionally high-spending school system without a dime of state aid.  Hoboken is in DFG FG though, so it would appear as a "middle wealth" district in the ELC's classification.

Even under the Education Law Center's alternative calculations for Adjustment Aid Hoboken would receive $3,808,821.  Is any aid stream that feeds so much money to New Jersey's highest-resource district progressive?   


Asbury Park Absurdity

Asbury Park would still get $23,420,836 in Adjustment Aid under the ELC's alternative calculations. That divided by Asbury Park's 2351 students is $9,962 per student.  Given that Asbury Park would get over $13,000 a student from other aids, is that extra $9,962 a student really the smartest use of precious state money?  Especially since Asbury Park only taxes itself at one-third of its Local Fair Share?

The inclusion of districts with good property tax bases like Jersey City, Hoboken and Shore districts as "lower wealth" districts makes Adjustment Aid look more progressive than it actually is.  Of the  $237 million going to "low wealth" districts, Jersey City alone gets $110 million.  Of the $216 million going to "former" Abbotts, Jersey City and Hoboken get $114 million.  Since economically Jersey City should not be an Abbott and Hoboken should not be an Abbott either demographically or economically, this just shows what a problem Adjustment Aid really is.  In actuality, a lower percentage of Adjustment Aid goes to truly needy districts than the Education Law Center realizes.  


The Education Law Center does make a parallel analysis of districts based on being Above Adequacy or Below Adequacy and, again, concedes that a huge portion of Adjustment Aid goes to districts that are Above Adequacy.


; $300 million would be allocated to 138 over adequacy districts, and $275 million to 50 below adequacy districts.

The Education Law Center concedes that $161 million of Adjustment Aid would go to districts that are Above Adequacy in their budgets and below Local Fair Share in their taxes, meaning Adjustment Aid just makes taxes lower for these districts and doesn't really contribute to public schools at all.

In the case of above adequacy districts receiving adjustment aid, about half the aid is allocated to districts that are over their LFS and about half to those below. Again, for those districts that are below their local share, at least some portion of adjustment aid is supporting the adequacy budget by replacing local revenue. About half of the $161 million in adjustment aid to above adequacy and below LFS districts is allocated to low wealth districts. This is expected as lower wealth communities have greater difficulty raising the local revenue required under the SFRA. [my emphasis]

I have to respect the Education Law Center's honesty in reporting information that weakens its argument, but I can't avoid thinking that Adjustment Aid is even less progressive than I earlier thought. I find it bizarre that the Education Law Center would side with well-funded, high-DFG districts like North Hunterdon/Voorhees ($1,569,421) in Adjustment Aid, Voorhees ($2,006,377), Marlboro, ($4,462,309) and Medford ($1,340,885) over struggling districts that get no Adjustment Aid and have gotten no new aid since SFRA.

The Education Law Center is aware of the disparities in New Jersey's aid distribution and knows that Adjustment Aid contributes to these disparities, but counters the demand for help for poor, underaided districts with a glib demand to just get "back on track to full funding of the SFRA."
“The goal of this policy brief is to clear up common misconceptions about hold harmless aid in the SFRA formula. Much of this aid is used to support the adequacy budgets of districts that are unable to, or restricted from, raising those funds themselves,” said Danielle Farrie, ELC Research Director and policy brief co-author. “It’s time to focus on the key task at hand – getting back on track to full funding of the SFRA to make sure all students receive the resources they need and a meaningful opportunity to succeed in school.”  [my emphasis]
There it is.  The Education Law Center's fundamental blindspot about the state budget and taxes.  

The Education Law Center exists in an alternative reality where the Great Recession never happened, there is no pension debt, and Atlantic City still has a thriving gambling industry.  It exists in a universe where New Jersey's economy is robust and not a laggard, where no retiree leaves New Jersey due to taxes, and the state has no need to raise taxes to replenish the Transportation Trust Fund.




The Education Law Center demands that the state fully fund SFRA but doesn't even acknowledge in that policy brief on Adjustment Aid how much fully funding SFRA would cost, let alone from whom New Jersey would take that money.  

The missing information is that the cost to bring every district up to its capped aid alone would be $1 billion, but bringing every district up to uncapped aid would be another billion above that, and universal Pre-K in all districts where more than 40% of the kids are FRL-eligible would be another $700 million.  

Please Education Law Center, where is the state supposed to get that money and find the other $4 billion a year to save the pension system?  And Education Law Center, what is New Jersey supposed to do if there is a bear market and capital gains taxes fall? or if there is a recession?  

The Education Law Center's policy brief on Adjustment Aid takes as a foundational belief that any policy mechanism that delivers any money to poor districts is automatically a good thing.  But even when  Adjustment Aid does succeed in hitting its targets and sending money to poor districts it isn't a smart use of state resources because more often than not it misses it low-resource targets altogether.

The Education Law Center looks at Adjustment Aid from the point of view solely of Adjustment Aid districts.  Yes, Adjustment Aid is good for the districts getting it, but it comes from a finite, zero-sum supply of money.  You have to look at the big picture and the reality that most poor districts get nothing in Adjustment Aid.  A large portion of Adjustment Aid, by the Education Law Center's own admittance, goes to districts that are not low-wealth at all.  

I don't think that Adjustment Aid should be suddenly taken away from Adjustment Aid districts, nor that every Adjustment Aid district should lose all its Adjustment Aid.  Cutting Adjustment Aid should be done carefully, but given the impossibility of fully funding SFRA, cutting Adjustment Aid is something that needs to happen.

----

Update: A more thorough analysis of how most of the DFG A and B districts the ELC calls "low wealth" are not "low wealth" in terms of tax base per student.

Thursday, September 24, 2015

NJ Pension Funds Bad Year Confirmed



New Jersey's pension investments yield 4.16% for the fiscal year, missing the benchmark for solvency of system.  The estimates on the health of the pension system assume a 7.9% rate of return.

New Jersey's giant public worker pension system lost $2 billion in the fiscal year that ended in June as investment returns sagged to 4.16 percent, state investment officials said Wednesday.
And the volatile stock market this summer brought an even bigger hit to pensions.
The value of the fund was $79 billion at the end of the fiscal year in June, down from about $81 billion a year before. The value dropped to less than $76 billion by the end of August, the chairman of the State Investment Council said.
Last year, the investments returned 16.9 percent, and over the past five years the fund has yielded 10.81 percent.
"We've all known returns like that were unlikely to last forever," said Tom Byrne, chairman of the State Investment Council, said at a meeting Wednesday.
The fund's investments returned 4.16 percent in the fiscal year that ended in June, according to unaudited figures released Wednesday While that was higher than the 2.93 percent benchmark of what other investments returned in various markets, it fell short of the pension system's 7.9 percent long-term assumed rate of return.
The pensions system lost money because while the investments added about $3.2 billion, about $8 billion is distributed to retirees each year, Byrne said. It needs to earn 10 percent a year just to keep up.

In the past few years the state has been under more and more criticism for making alternative investments, ie, hedge fund investments. Critics say that the large fees, at least $600 million, are justified robbery.

According to Thomas Byrne, the head of the investments council, NJ's alternative investments actually performed well.

"The four best-performing asset categories for the fiscal year that recently ended were all part of the alternative investment program," he said. "Alternatives as a whole returned about 7.9 percent for the year, nearly double the returns we made elsewhere."
Seven investment categories performed better than the overall fund, and six of those are alternative investments, according to a Division of Investment report.
"Had we been 70 percent stocks and 30 percent bonds in the last five years, as some have advocated, our results would have been considerably worse," Byrne said.

New Jersey's pension debts verge on being unpayable, but no matter what, the Pension Crisis is going to affect New Jersey's education aid.

As I've said numerous times before, SFRA is unfundable. The state cannot make the aid distribution fair by making the pie larger and giving more money to the underaided districts.

The only economically viable solution to aid unfairness is REDISTRIBUTION.

Friday, September 18, 2015

"Truth in Accounting" Puts NJ's Debt at $52,300 Per Person

NJ's debt per person is estimated at the country's absolute worst by Truth in Accounting.


I'm not an accountant and I'm sure there are people who would quibble with TIA's methodology, but if their methodology is consistent state-to-state this does indicate immense relative challenges for New Jersey.  

Wednesday, September 9, 2015

New Jersey Public Sector Unions Take Fight for Full Pension Contributions to US Supreme Court


Public sector unions are taking their legal battle against Christie for full pension contributions to the US Supreme Court:

Another 16 New Jersey public worker unions are asking the U.S. Supreme Court to consider whether the state's highest court erred by declaring a pension funding agreement between the state and employees unenforceable.
In a petition filed with the U.S. Supreme Court, lawyers for 16 labor groups — including the New Jersey Education Association, Communications Workers of America and the Policemen's Benevolent Association — argued that the New Jersey Supreme Court should have applied the protections of the federal Contract Clause to the deal.
Hetty Rosenstein, state director for the CWA, said Tuesday that the organizations will "leave no stone unturned."
"One way or another we will protect these pensions. We will never allow the state of New Jersey to destroy the pensions that 800,000 people depend on," she said.

Legal experts do not expect the US Supreme Court to hear the case, but if the US Supreme Court heard the case and took any side in pension funding battles the consequences would be immense for state and municipal finance nationwide.  

Monday, August 31, 2015

Assemblyman Ciattarelli pension and state aid changes: a mixed review


Assemblyman Jack Ciattarelli proposes cutting teacher pensions and cutting state aid for the highest aid districts:

“It’s becoming more and more difficult to navigate our fiscal obstacle course and a lot of that has to do with us meeting these (pension payment) obligations,” said Assemblyman Jack Ciattarelli (R-Somerville). “In a state that already has one of the highest income tax rates, the highest property taxes, an estate tax, one of the highest sales taxes, we have all this tax revenue and we augment it with casino revenue taxes and lotteries, how is it that we can’t make these payments? The reason is because they’re becoming more and more expensive.”
Facets of Ciattarelli’s proposals include:

• No community is allowed to fund less than 25 percent of their school budget through the local tax levy (some communities fund less than 15 percent of their school budget, while others fund more than 90 percent)

• No community can abate school property taxes on new development (to encourage development, communities can abate municipal and county taxes if they so choose)

• For all current and future teacher retirees, no post-retirement Medicare Part B reimbursement if their pension plus social security equals or exceeds $30,000 per year

• For all teachers with less than 10 years in system, pension account is switched over to defined contribution pension plan (e.g., 401(k))

• All newly hired teachers go immediately into defined contribution pension plan (e.g., 401(k)) and their pension and Social Security are paid for by the local school district, not the state.


• "Cadillac" health insurance plans are discontinued for all newly hired teachers and all others at end of current contract

Even though they should support some change to the PILOT law, the NJEA, unsurprisingly, opposes these proposals wholesale.

“Assemblyman Ciattarelli’s proposal is deeply flawed for a number of reasons,” said NJEA President Wendell Steinhauer in an emailed response. “First, it specifically targets teachers. Given the scope of the state’s pension failures, that is utterly inappropriate. Second, none of his proposals do anything to reduce the unfunded liability that the state has created as a result of its many years of funding failures. The pension problem cannot be solved with more benefit cuts. It can only be solved with responsible funding. Finally, his plan would further degrade pensions of teachers, who are already paying far more for both their pensions and health benefits while the state fails to do its part.”
Wendell Steinhauer ignores that there is a funding component of Ciattarelli's plan. Ciattarelli proposes that every district pay at least 25% of its school budget from its local tax levy and then use the state aid savings for pensions. Since there are scores of large, usually urban, districts that pay less than 25% of their school budget locally, this potentially frees up large amounts of money.

While New Jersey will eventually have to cut education aid to pay its pension obligations and it will be necessary to cut the Abbotts, the 25% minimum share requirement for a school district budget needs refinement.

Just because a district pays for less than 25% of its school budget doesn't necessarily mean that the district is overaided nor that the town is undertaxed.

Paterson, for instance, has the state pay for about 80% of its budget ($405 million of $505 million), but Paterson has exceptionally low income ($15,543 per capita), low property resources ($242k per student in valuation), and a very high FRL-eligible percentage (90%). In fact, despite that $405 million in aid, Paterson only gets 85% of its uncapped aid.

Paterson's local tax levy is only $39 million on that $505 million budget, so Paterson would be due for immense tax increases/spending cuts under Ciattarelli's plan. For Paterson to pay 25% of its budget it would have to pay $126 million, or three times more than it pays now. Paterson's (equalized) tax levy is already 0.58 so sure, it could pay somewhat more, but if its school tax levy proportionally increased it would become 1.87.  A $126 Local Tax Levy for Paterson would be above its Local Fair Share of $97 million.

On top of the high school tax burden, Paterson residents would still have to pay county and municipal taxes. Paterson's tax levy is already 3.570, which is very high. If Paterson had to pay the higher school taxes that Ciattarelli is allowing, its very high tax burden would climb to nearly 5%.

A better solution would be to require any district receiving Equalization Aid to pay 100% of its Local Fair Share (or 80%, to use a more realistic figure).

Unfortunately, Ciattarelli's proposal would also leave untouched New Jersey's biggest aid hoarders.

For instance:

• Hoboken gets 184% of its recommended SFRA aid but would lose nothing since its Local Tax Levy is already 75% of its school budget.
•Ocean City, Cape May gets 562% of its recommended SFRA aid but would would lose nothing since its Local Tax Levy is 50% of its school budget.
•Jersey City gets 136% of its recommended SFRA aid (this translates to $111.7 million) but would lose only about $30 million (of its $566 million budget) because Jersey City already pays for 20% of its schools.

Of course Ciattarelli's proposal would face opposition from the legislature and the NJ Supreme Court. Ciattarelli gets credit for facing reality on pensions and I appreciate his boldness on PILOT problems, but this 25% minimum proposal needs some reform.

Sunday, August 30, 2015

"Steve Sweeney: Restoring pension COLAs would bankrupt N.J. system"



Senate president Stephen Sweeney says of the case against the state by former public employees to restore Cost of Living Adjustments will bankrupt New Jersey:

"I don't think they win it, to be honest with you. And I think it would cause the bankruptcy of the pension system."

John Bury of Bury Pensions says that the pension system is bankrupt anyway, but according to the NJ Treasury, the COLA suspension accounted for $74 billion of the $122 billion savings from the 2011 Pension Reform.  If COLA payments are restored the only provisions left of the 2011 Pension Reform will be increased (active) employee contributions and the increased retirement age.

Charles Ouslander, a plaintiff who is now seeking to accelerate New Jersey's bankruptcy, says "I don't think that if COLAs are reinstated it will bankrupt the system" but then seems to think that "bankrupt" and "deplete the funds" mean effectively differently things. "I do think it it will deplete the fund that much sooner, and frankly if that provides a sense of urgency as to how they're going to fix the funding problem, then so be it. This should light a fire under everyone."

Ouslander's idea of "fixing the funding problem" probably means screwing younger employees by cutting their pensions and making taxpayers pay even more.

Charles Ouslander himself gets a $67,183 annual pension based on twenty years of employment as a county prosecutor. He was born in 1962 and retired in 2010, meaning he "retired" at age 48.

Don't think that because Ouslander collects a pension that he is retired.  He is now an active public defender and has been a municipal court judge and lawyer for the ASPCA.  He gets a pension on top his other salaries.

Charles Ouslander says "“It’s simply not fair to change the rules in the middle of the game. For the people who had already retired before the law took effect, they changed the score after the game.”

Charles Ouslander forgets that the pension law was changed "in the middle of the game" in his favor in 2001 with Donald Di Francesco's pension increases.  Di Francesco's pension increases applied retroactively to retirees, so according to Ouslander, the pension can be made more generous "in the middle of the game," but not less generous.

To the next generation of New Jerseyans who will have to suffer from paying pensions like Charles Ouslander's that are exorbitant relative to age of the retiree and years served, Charles Ouslander says "nuts."




Monday, August 24, 2015

New Jersey loses 26,100 jobs in June and July

The next recession may have come early to the Garden State:

New Jersey lost 26,100 jobs in June and July, the state’s worst two-month loss since the spring of 2009 at the end of the recession, nearly wiping out all the gains for the year.
The figures, detailed Thursday in the state employment report for July, paint a far darker jobs picture than had been the case for the first five months of the year, when the state added jobs each month and appeared headed to a moderately healthy gain of 45,000 jobs for the year. 
Instead, the state has now added just 3,700 jobs this year, according to the report from the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development. At that rate, the state would gain just 6,500 jobs in 2015. 
The weak figures surprised economists, who could find few bright spots in the report, or explanations for the job losses. 
“It’s hot and it’s ugly,” said Charles Steindel, the state's former chief economist under Governor Christie and now a resident scholar at the Anisfield School of Business at Ramapo College of New Jersey. 
“I have no particular optimism here,” he said. “That was not a good report … We just have to face it. We have had two bad reports.”


The job losses were in several sectors of the economy:


The state’s worst performing sectors were leisure and hospitality (down 7,400 jobs), professional and business services (down 5,200 jobs) and financial activities (down 2,700 jobs). 
There were gains in the trade, transportation and utilities sector (up 4,300 jobs) and the education and health services sector (up 300 jobs). 
Hughes said the large loss in the leisure and hospitality sector might be due to the contracting of casinos in Atlantic City, or because seasonal shore hiring still hasn't recovered from hurricane Sandy. 
Professional and business services was the state's second biggest loser, and paints a disturbing picture for corporations in New Jersey. 
"Professional and business services was a big loser for two straight months, and that doesn’t have much of a seasonal factor, that’s a core sector of the economy that would suggest big corporations are not hiring in New Jersey," Hughes said.


Technically New Jersey's unemployment rate fell from 6.1% to 5.9% (which Christie will brag about), but that is because of people leaving the workforce.

This is terrible for the individuals affected, but if this is a harbinger of things to come in New Jersey - or even if the job picture is just stagnant and not negative - these job losses combined with the bear market on Wall Street ( = drops in capital gains taxes (NJ's capital gains tax is one of the highest in the country)) will translate into large revenue problems for state government.

The consequences for the state budget are clear: FY2017 will be another year NJ cannot fully fund its pensions or SFRA.



Thursday, August 20, 2015

Moody's Warns of New Credit Rating Downgrades for NJ



Moody's warns that if the NJ Supreme Court orders that the state must pay Cost of Living Adjustments (COLAs) New Jersey's credit rating will fall again.


From NorthJersey.com:

New Jersey’s low-end credit rating could fall again if the state Supreme Court rules that retired public workers are entitled to yearly increases in their pensions, according to Moody’s Investors Service.
A lawsuit challenging one of Governor Christie’s pension-reform laws is pending at the high court, specifically over a section that froze pensioners’ yearly cost-of-living adjustments. The court is expected to hear oral argument at its new term, which begins next month.
Analysts at Moody’s issued a rare warning on Monday. New Jersey’s A2 credit rating, one of the lowest among the 50 states, could go down again if Christie received “an unfavorable court decision in the pension litigation regarding COLAs,” Moody’s said.

One of the plaintiffs of the case projects that if COLAs are reinstated NJ will immediately have to pay $1.1-$1.2 billion in back COLA pay dating back to 2011 and thereafter have to come up with another $30 million a month.

From the actual Moody's Report:


"The negative outlooks reflects our expectation that the state's financial and leverage position will weaken further before structural balance is restored. Without meaningful structural changes that improve the affordability or the state's liabilities, the state's structural imbalance will persist and/or the pension liabilities will grow, and the state's rating will continue to fall."

Tuesday, August 11, 2015

Diane D'Amico Covers the Unfairness of Christie's "Flat Aid" Policies

Kudos to Diane D'Amico the Press of Atlantic City for good coverage of what Christie and the NJ legislature are doing with state aid.  Diane D'Amico, New Jersey's best state aid reporter, realizes that Christie's policy of not allowing any district to lose a cent of aid might initially sound benign, but it hurts districts that have growing enrollments and/or shrinking property bases and thereby exacerbates economic gaps between school districts.  

Nowhere is this more obvious than in Egg Harbor Township, once among the fastest-growing municipalities in the state.  But state education funding has never kept up with enrollment, which increased almost 35 percent, to nearly 8,000 students, between 2000 and 2007.Casino closings have led to enrollment dipping to 7,600 students, but new affordable-housing mandates could again bring in more families.The School Reform Funding Act of 2008 [SFRA] promised a more equitable distribution of funds based on student needs. It fell victim to the recession and has been replaced by a largely 'flat funding' model that seems to treat everyone equally but actually benefits shrinking districts while penalizing those with growing enrollment or need.

Many districts in New Jersey have had student population growth but Egg Harbor Township's growth is well above average.  Aside from the sheer increase in student population, Egg Harbor Township's students are becoming poorer and this create new challenges for the school district.

Almost half of all students in the district are eligible for the federal free-lunch program, up from less than 30 percent a decade ago. More than 700 properties within the school district are in some stage of foreclosure.
Indeed, Egg Harbor Township only gets 58% of its uncapped aid.  It should be getting $28.7 million more than it is, a $3941 per student deficit.

The biggest problem in state aid is the Pension Crisis and the state's inability to increase overall K-12 spending.  However, Chris Christie has some leeway to redistribute money away from districts like Hoboken and Jersey City but he has chosen not to in favor of a policy that lets him brag about how his model "ensures that no district will receive less state aid than the amount received for FY2015." The Christie DOE is oblivious to the fact that in per pupil terms and per assessed wealth terms numerous districts "receive less aid than the amount received for FY2015."

Chris Christie deserves most of the blame for this, but not all of the blame.  No one in the legislature aggressively calls to end flat funding and explains how this hurts districts like Egg Harbor Township. The New Jersey School Boards Association, supposedly the representative of all districts, and Education Law Center, supposedly the representative of low-resource districts, have supported Christie's policy of not allowing any district to lose aid.   The Corzine-era School Funding Reform Act itself strenuously tries to prevent any district from losing aid.  Christie fails as New Jersey's head of government, but the true fault belongs to the entire Establishment.

Again, kudos to Diane D'Amico for covering this.  I especially liked the Lynne Strickland quote she used to end the piece:

“The formula is hitting the fan. We have to start having the discussion of how to get out of this ever-deepening hole.”
I just hope that someone is listening.

Wednesday, August 5, 2015

The Role of Abbott Funding in NJ’s Pension Crisis


When people in New Jersey talk about the pensions crisis the focus is always on who underfunded the pensions, never why. Surprisingly few people wonder about the paradox of how New Jersey, whose credit rating was once AAA, whose income is the second highest in the country, whose taxes are high, and whose pension generosity is average, could become so hopelessly indebted.

 When New Jerseyans look for whom to blame the state’s gigantic indebtedness on the villains are always our governors, as if the governors were the only people who controlled New Jersey’s fiscal policy. The explanation for the crisis is rarely deeper than “the governors raided the pension funds.”

The political series of events in the early 1990s that created the pension crisis is very complex, but at the same time the problem was simple: the pension system had fundamental problems that grew into disaster as the state taxed too little and spent too much.

This essay focuses on where New Jersey spent too much.  The Abbott decision is not the primary cause of pension underfunding, but neither is it unrelated.  Without pension underfunding, the massive Abbott spending rampup would have required tax increases that the public would not have tolerated.  The Republican tax cuts of 1992-1996 removed more money that could have gone to pensions than the Abbott mandate did, but those tax cuts did not last as long as the Abbott regime has lasted. Of items on the spending side of the ledger, the Supreme Court’s mandate for “Parity Plus Funding” in the Abbott districts plus two years of Pre-K and 100% state construction responsibility were and remain major contributors to pension underfunding.


1990

There may not have been any good time for New Jersey to embark on as expensive a program as Abbott, but 1990 was a particularly bad time to do it in New Jersey. New Jersey’s economy was already in recession, a federal Social Security tax increase had kicked in, the state had a $600 million deficit that year and a forecast of a $1 billion deficit for the next year.

The deficit was mostly due to the recession, but there was a structural deficit due to pension costs.

Source
https://tinyurl.com/yc9obxdr
The pension system at the time was fully funded, but costs were increasing by 10% a year.  Analysts even then were calling the pension system a "ticking time bomb."  During the previous eight years state government costs in Jersey had doubled, but pension costs had tripled, and COLA costs had quadrupled. Policy makers had realized that in creating a teacher pension system paid by the state but determined by salaries agreed to by local school districts the state had given local districts a blank check.  The locally determined/state funded hybrid pension system incentivized school districts and unions to agree to salary guides that backloaded pay because high pay at the end of a career would translate into salary savings for the school district, but a high pension paid for by state taxpayers.


New Jersey’s governor in 1990 was a former Congressman named Jim Florio. In Congress he had distinguished himself on environmental issues as the author of the Superfund law, but one thing that helped him win the governorship was an oft-repeated statement that the saw “no need for new taxes.”

But in addition to the recession, New Jersey's budget problems were exacerbated by the Abbott II decision of June 5th, 1990. In lofty language, Chief Justice Robert Wilentz said of urban poor students:

The students of Newark and Trenton are no less citizens than their friends in Millburn and Princeton. They are entitled to be treated equally, to begin at the same starting line. Today the disadvantaged are doubly mistreated: first, by the accident of their environment and, second, by the disadvantage added by an inadequate education. The State has compounded the wrong and must right it.
The urban districts were indeed less well-funded than the richest suburban districts, but contrary to popular belief, the future Abbott districts were actually only slightly below the state's average.   Nonetheless, many expected (and wanted) the New Jersey Supreme Court to order more money for urban poor districts, hopefully bringing them up to the 60th percentile in spending.

But the New Jersey Supreme Court went farther than most anticipated with the “Parity Plus Doctrine;”

Obviously, we are no more able to identify what these disadvantaged students need in concrete educational terms than are the experts. What they don't need is more disadvantage, in the form of a school district that does not even approach the funding level that supports advantaged students. They need more, and the law entitles them to more.

Wilentz’ Parity Plus Doctrine meant that the children of the low-resource urban districts (and only low-resource urban districts) had a Constitutional right to the same school spending that children in the richest 108 suburbs got, plus additional money for supplemental programs. The consequence of the “Parity Plus” doctrine was that the state had to find at least $440 million to the Abbott districts within four years at a time when the state’s budget was only $12 billion and the recession was deepening.

Jim Florio praised the Abbott decision as "a clear cut victory for the children of our state," but he knew that it would be politically impossible (and unfair) to give new money to only the Abbott districts, so he thus crafted a proposal to direct over $1 billion in new state aid to the Abbotts plus another 330 districts. The Abbott districts and the other districts to gain aid represented a 75% majority of New Jersey students and, critically, their Assemblymen and Senators represented a majority of the New Jersey legislature.

Despite his statements about seeing “no need” for a tax increase, Florio persuaded the legislature to pass a $2.8 billion tax increase for Abbott plus other programs, the largest proportional tax increase in American state history. Florio and the legislature doubled the top tax rate to 7.0%, increased other rates, added a penny to the sales tax, and created new taxes on everything from trucks to telephone bills to toilet paper.

But new money from taxes wasn’t enough.

If the “Parity Plus Doctrine” was ever going to be affordable the state not only had to give more money to the Abbotts, but it had to reduce and restrain spending in the suburbs whose spending the state now had to match in the Abbotts. Two more mechanisms to both free up money for the Abbotts and restrain suburban spending were necessary.

  • Require all school districts to now pay for the pensions, retiree health care, and Social Security costs of their employees, but give new state aid to compensate for those costs to all but “wealthy” school districts. 150 “affluent” school districts would be completely on their own for retiree benefits while another 70 would be partially on their own. 
  • Eliminate almost all state aid from the 220 “affluent” districts and give it to the poorer districts. 

Florio passed this far-reaching and expensive reforms and tax increases in a legislative blitz of less than one month.

The State Says "No"

The result of these unprecedented tax and education finance changes was the most ferocious tax and interest group rebellion in New Jersey’s or even any state’s modern history.

Taxpayers were incensed. A group “Hands Across New Jersey” sprung up to protest the tax hikes and change New Jersey’s constitution to allow recalls and voter-initiated referenda. The leader of the “Hands Across New Jersey,” John Budzash of Howell Township, said he was personally unaffected by Florio’s income tax hikes, but his opposition to them was on principle: “It’s ridiculous to try to take money away from people that work and earn their money and give it to people that don’t.”

No less furious was the NJEA. The teachers were adamantly against making local school districts
One Chart Says It All.
Source, Dept of Education

assume responsibility for retiree benefits because they knew that school districts would harden their opposition to raises if they later had to pay pensions on them. As the president of the NJEA said, "If you have to pay the pensions and you want to keep the cost of pensions down, you keep down the salaries." The NJEA did not believe the Florio administration’s assurances that their pensions would be protected if school districts were unable to make their contributions.

Finally, suburban school districts were irate at the near-complete loss of state aid and the new pension mandate, realizing that taxes would double in five years. Faced with inevitable cuts, one superintendent warned “Excellent school systems in the state will become mediocre.” Another said ''Anything that makes our district unique will be put on the chopping block.” When the Florio administration promised to set up a “blue ribbon panel” to help suburban districts deal with their losses of aid Livingston's superintendent said "It's like shooting someone in the kneecap and then appointing a committee to help that person learn to walk with crutches." Since pension costs were increasing by 10% a year, suburban residents felt like Jim Florio was thrusting a ticking time bomb into their arms.

Additionally, Florio’s list of “wealthy” districts slated to lose aid included many districts and many individuals that had never been considered “wealthy” before. Working class towns like Belleville, Hackensack, and Clifton were even slated to lose at least some aid.

As one South Orange resident wrote in the local newspaper:

Yes, I am for equal education, but how many people must I be responsible for? I happen to be a single parent who resides in the so-called “wealthy” village of South Orange. But, we moved into South Orange before the divorce and my family and I are still here because of lots of hard work. Now, as it might happen, when the taxes go up, we might have to move. You ask, how do I feel? I am furious. Furious enough to write. 
...Yes, we will be destroyed. We are being destroyed very slowly but it is happening. Maybe not the wealthy, but we, the blue collar workers won’t be around…. I know where I fit in. I work too hard, I am tired and I am scared. I don’t want to lose my home, uproot my family and have them change schools and friends. I don’t want to change my lifestyle because I must be responsible for other people.

To the residents of many middle class New Jerseyans whose communities faced huge tax increases or cuts, the transformation in state aid and pensions was no “clear cut victory” for their children. The advocates for Abbott may have seen themselves as Robin Hoods, but Robin Hood stole from the rich and in the eyes of the state Jim Florio stole from the middle class.

Jim Florio’s approval rating plummeted to 18%. “Florio Free in ‘93” bumper stickers appeared everywhere. Despite near-immediate backpedaling from the Democratic party, hundreds of Democrats who had nothing to do with Abbott or Florio were voted out of office. Bill Bradley barely won reelection to the Senate in 1990 against an underfinanced and obscure county freeholder named Christine Todd Whitman. The NJEA endorsed scores of Republican candidates in the legislative elections.

The Democrats and Jim Florio went into a rapid retreat before 1990 even ended. $360 million originally intended for education was redirected to tax relief. The aid cuts to suburban schools were suspended. The plan to have local school districts pay for retiree benefits was suspended. The suspension and later cancellation of aid cuts to the suburbs and offloading pension responsibility was doubly costly in the long-run. First, the state lost the offset it needed to pay for Abbott; second, by removing a constraint from suburban spending the suburbs could spend more than they would have otherwise. Since the funding for the Abbott districts was judicially tied to spending in the suburbs, when wealthy districts approved large budget increases it automatically meant large percentage increases in the Abbotts.

All of Florio's retreat wasn't enough to save the legislative Democrats and hundreds of Democratic office holders at the county and local level.  In 1991 Republicans won veto-proof control of the legislature.

Pension Responsibility Dropped

Despite the tax rebellion and the reversal of his plans to financially support the “Parity Plus Doctrine,” Florio, the Education Law Center, and the NJ Supreme Court were still determined to increase state aid for the Abbotts. Florio had become notorious for his “$2.8 billion tax increase” but the tax increase hadn’t created that much revenue and the state still had a deficit. The Republicans, for their part, were still determined to undo Jim Florio’s sales tax increase, a $600 million annual loss. For a solution to the budget crunch and to avert severe cuts to middle-income school districts, Florio and the legislature turned to reducing the state's annual pension contribution.

The New York Times wrote simply:

The protests [from middle income districts over lost aid] quickly dissipated when education officials announced plans for the extra infusion of $341 million, which would be made possible by reducing the state's contribution to public employee pension funds.

The reduction of state contributions was made legal by the Pension Reevaluation Act of 1992. The Pension Reevaluation Act changed the actuarial valuation of NJ's pension assets and increased the expected rate of return from 7.0% to 8.75%. Overnight, the value of NJ’s pension funds rose from $24 billion to $29 billion. Due to PRA, New Jersey could legally spend $770 million less in FY1993 and FY1994 (combined) on pensions and $570 million less thereafter, much of which could go to schools.

It should be noted that pension reevaluation had been considered before and many states reevaluated their pensions in the same way. The Pension Reevaluation Act’s reassessments turned out to be correct given that they preceded the booming 1990s stock market and economy.

Most of the public sector unions accepted pension reevaluation, however, there was one group from the AFL-CIO that sued the state and denounced pension reevaluation "They'll want to balance the budget with our pension monies."

It was under Christine Todd Whitman that the state totally committed to "buy now, pay later."   Whitman kicked the last leg out of Florio’s strategy to pay for Abbott and the rest of government by cutting income taxes by 30%.

The top two brackets remained higher than they were pre-Florio, but the tax cuts cost NJ hundreds of millions of dollars a year and that could have gone into the pensions. Whitman also stopped pre-funding retiree health costs too in the "Pension Reform Act of 1994."

Despite the tax rebellion and the absence of any offsets to fund Abbott, over the next decade the New Jersey Supreme Court repeatedly overruled the legislature on state aid laws, ignored warnings about pensions being underfunded, and added new mandates for Abbott funding, such as two years of “free” Pre-K and 100% facilities funding (which eventually cost $8.9 billion). Flush with money from the booming 1990s economy, Whitman sent a tidal wave of money to the Abbotts. From 1989-90 to 1995-96, state aid for the Abbotts increased from $1 billion to $1.8 billion. By 1997 the Supreme Court’s Parity Plus mandate was reached and the Abbotts equaled or exceeded spending in NJ’s richest districts.

Source, DOE Public Data for 1996-97 onward, OPRA request data from 1989-1996. http://pension360.org/chart-a-history-of-new-jerseys-pension-payments/ and WSJ for pension data.


From 1996-1997 to 2000-2001 the state increased Abbott aid from $1.8 to $2.5 billion. Even the early 2000s recession put no dent in Abbott funding, with funding increasing even more rapidly as the Pre-K mandate kicked in, reaching $4.1 billion a year 2004-2005 and $5 billion now. From the early 1990s to 2010, the percentage of state education aid going to the Abbotts rose from 28% to 61% even as their share of the state student population fell from 25% to 20%.

And in 2000 the legislature authorized $8.6 in bonding for (mostly) Abbott construction, the largest bond offering in NJ history.  ($8.6 billion = $11.83 billion in 2015 dollars)

As the state put more and more money into the Abbotts it put less and less into pension system. In 1990 New Jersey had put $750 million into the pension system. From 1994-1996 the state only put in $200-250 million. The PRA’s assumptions turned out to be correct, so even the lower funding should not have been fatal to the pension system, but then in 1997 and 1998 the state started to ignore actuarial recommendations and put in less than $100 million per year.  Even after the stock market bubble burst in 2001, Gov. Donald Di Francesco increased pension generosity by 9% (retroactively to retirees). Starting in 2001 the state began a multiyear streak of contributing nothing while it massively increased Abbott funding.  It is not a coincidence that the big rampup of Abbott spending in the early 2000s were the worst years for pension contributions.

Ultimately, when the state couldn’t offload pension obligations onto local districts it dropped them altogether. 

 

The Impossible Compromise

Abbott was implemented after a four-way compromise between the taxpayers, suburban districts, the NJEA, and the Education Law Center. 

The compromise was supposed to be that taxes stayed moderate, the suburbs kept their aid, pension costs remained a state responsibility, and the Abbotts saw massive increases in aid. But the state drastically reduced its pension contributions and then abandoned contributions altogether.

Policy makers have been slow to realize that a tidal wave of pension debt is hitting New Jersey. The full actuarial contribution NJ should be making for pensions is at least $5 billion and the unfunded liability is $83 billion. Annual payouts are $9.65 billion and rising. Even if the funds meet their investment benchmarks, the pension funds will “zero out” starting in 2021 and the teachers’ own fund will zero-out in 2027. No version of a “Millionaire’s Tax” brings in anywhere near enough money even for the actuarial payment. The debts are on the verge of unpayable.

The Abbott decision represented as far as any American state has come in attempting to give (some) poor children opportunity equal to wealthier children. NJ’s urban districts did need more aid than they were getting in 1990 and Jim Florio tried honestly to deal with the costs of Abbott funding and preexisting issues in pensions, but the fierce counterreaction showed that the state was not ready to accept higher taxes and the teachers were not willing to give up future wage growth in order to have a sustainable pension system.

Arguing over the relative roles of the Whitman tax cuts and Abbott funding in creating the pension disaster is a moot argument because the Whitman tax cuts have already been reversed and income tax rates in New Jersey are higher now than they were under Florio. The high funding levels of the Abbott districts do still exist and the Supreme Court remains blind to the state’s fiscal reality as well as the non-results of Abbott funding. In 2011, even after revenues had fallen by billions and the ticking of the pension time bomb was audible again, the Supreme Court blocked the cuts to the Abbotts, while allowing cuts to all other districts. Christie accepted the decision and the state reverted to making negligible pension contributions.

Implementation of the Abbott decision is not the sole reason New Jersey has pension problems, nor even the primary reason, but it is a major reason. The Abbott decisions was more or less of a factor at different times, but the early 2000s, when pension payments were $0 and Abbott funding increased enormously, were a time when Abbott and pension underfunding are the most clearly linked. New Jersey’s governors have been irresponsible, but so has the whole political establishment, including the NJ Supreme Court, the legislature, and special interest groups.

At this point New Jersey's pension debts are so enormous that allowing the Abbott districts to have more modest levels of funding would not be sufficient to balance the pension system, but just because something doesn’t completely solve a problem doesn’t mean that it isn’t, unfortunately, necessary.  If New Jersey is ever going to put its house in order cuts to the Abbott districts must be made.

See Also:


Tuesday, August 4, 2015

"Why NJ's School Funding Reform Act of 2008 failed and where we go from here"



Newsworks ran my op-ed on the unfundability of SFRA.

The op-ed says what everyone who follows NJ's budget should know but doesn't seem to realize.
... SFRA was a method of distributing new aid and not a redistribution of the existing aid stream. In order to prevent any redistribution of aid -- especially from Abbott districts -- SFRA contained a provision for something titled "Adjustment Aid." Adjustment Aid guarantees that any district for whom the new SFRA aid calculations give less aid than it got under the previous funding law that it would be "held harmless" and could keep their old aid and even receive aid growth at 2 percent that first year.
If New Jersey had experienced economic and revenue growth after 2008 and the state could pour an additional $2 billion a year into SFRA, New Jersey's school districts might finally have fairness based on needs and resources, but the reality is that SFRA was signed at New Jersey's peak employment. The recession hit the next year and Jon Corzine himself and later Chris Christie slashed over $1 billion in funding from New Jersey's public schools.
And now even though the recession has been over for over five years, New Jersey has no chance of fully funding SFRA now and the ideology of the next governor is irrelevant.
The reason for this is plain: the Pension Crisis. New Jersey's unfunded pension liabilities verge on being unpayable - $82.7 billion as of mid-2014. For FY 2013, New Jersey's pension funds paid out $9.1 billion in pension benefits but only received $4.6 billion in contributions from the state, localities, and active employees. The $4.5 billion gap means that the pension funds are rapidly depleting and will start to "zero-out" within a decade. According to Moody's, even if the pension funds hit their 7.9 percent investment goal (which they didn't in 2014), the Judicial Retirement System will go broke in 2021, then the Police and Firemen's Retirement System and the state portion of PERS in 2024, and then the biggest fund, the Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund (TPAF) will go broke in 2027.

Thursday, July 30, 2015

NJ Supreme Court to Hear COLA Case



The NJ Supreme Court has voted unanimously to hear the case on the constitutionality of suspending COLA increases for pensions.  (COLA=Cost of Living Allowances). 

COLA increases were suspended in 2011 in order to save the state $80 billion dollars.

Pension increases were expected to remain frozen for all retired public workers until the pension funds returned to sound fiscal footing, which was considered to be funded at a level of 80 percent and was at first expected to take two to three decades starting in 2011.


In recent years, however, New Jersey’s economic growth failed to match Christie’s rosy forecasts and the governor began to cut yearly budget contributions to the struggling pension system, undermining one of the central beams of his plan to replenish the pension system.


The state pension funds – which have 773,000 beneficiaries – are facing $40 billion in unfunded liabilities, according to state actuaries. The system is funded at a level of 51 percent and may run dry within a decade, financial analysts say.



If the Supreme Court rules in favor of COLA benefits the demise of state aid will come even sooner and more severely than I or anyone else anticipates.

We are doomed.



http://www.northjersey.com/news/supreme-court-to-hear-n-j-pension-cost-of-living-case-1.1383835

Jersey City's Development Boom, Pre-K, and the Aid Cuts Coming Your Way




It's a great time to be mayor of Jersey City. With new construction everywhere around him, Mayor Steve Fulop has predicted that Jersey City will overtake Newark to become the state's largest city by the end of 2016.
"I think that as New York City — Manhattan — has become less affordable, people look for alternatives. We’re situated in a sweet spot. We have 5,600 units under construction — more than any other city in the state — and another 7,000 on deck next year."




[Above: "Journal Squared"]

I'm not saying that this growth isn't good for New Jersey as a whole, but it comes with a downside for school finance for non-Abbott districts. The downside for school finance is that Jersey City's development boom is expected to increase the size of the Pre-K population by 25% by 2017 and keep growing thereafter. Since Jersey City is an Abbott and the NJ Supreme Court requires the state to pay 100% of Pre-K costs for all children in the Abbott districts, this means that New Jersey will have at least a 25% increase in Pre-K costs for Jersey City.  Although the residents of Jersey City's new construction will pay state taxes, reality is that all that new state revenue will go to the Pension Crisis. This means that that Jersey City's Pre-K growth will but even more pressure on education aid for other school districts.

Steve Fulop understands that the Pre-K population is going to increase. He is thus offering tax abatements to developers who provide space for Pre-K classrooms in new buildings.


Building more pre-K centers is a signature initiative of the Fulop administration, which is offering developers longer tax breaks if they commit to building them. The district doesn’t have enough public space for the 4,500 pre-K students enrolled now, and that number is expected to grow dramatically as development in Jersey City expands.
Just how much is Jersey City's Pre-K population boom going to cost New Jersey?

Jersey City now gets $67.5 million for Pre-K. With 2% inflation and 25% population growth, this means that in five years Jersey City's Pre-K will cost $93.5 million. Unless the New Jersey Supreme Court comes to its senses, that additional $26 million will be taken away from other New Jersey school districts.




The Pension Crisis is the predominant pressure on K-12 aid across the state, but increased expenditures for Pre-K funding in the Abbotts also hurt and Jersey City's increase is disproportionate to the other Abbotts. For 2015-16 Jersey City's increase for Pre-K was $2.7 million. That might not sound like a lot at first, but remember that the whole Pre-K and K-12 increase for New Jersey was only $8 million.

What's additionally ridiculous about this is that most of Jersey City's new residents are high-income. Over the next few years the absurdity of rich Abbott residents getting "free" Pre-K while poor non-Abbott residents go hang is going to become even more common.

Jersey City residents seem to be clueless about their exorbitant privilege. The Hudson Reporter ran this story about a creative director named Josh Bryant who waited in line for 48 hours for his son's "free" Pre-K education.

Josh Bryant, a 39-year-old tattooed creative director at a publishing company, used to wait in line to see bands like The Clash.
Now, he's waiting in line for something more important: his son's education.
Bryant and dozens of other parents are queued up – for up to nearly 48 hours – to secure one of 90 free (that is, state-paid) "first come, first served" preK spots for their 3-year-olds at Concordia Childhood Learning Center.
It's one of 38 preschool programs with Jersey City Board of Education contracts, Concordia's director Migdalia Viole said - but it's become so desirable that some professional parents worried about a segregative effect.
"I sort of regret the fact that I am able to take two days off work to sit here. Not everybody can do that," said Bryant, who started waiting at 11 a.m. Thursday.

Jersey City kids still get "free" Pre-K no matter what. Josh Bryant should "regret" the fact that poor kids outside the Abbott bubble GET NOTHING.

In conclusion, the rigid Abbott Pre-K mandate combined with the Pension Crisis means that Jersey City will enjoy funding increases while the rest of the state's districts see decreases.